

IT MATTERS HOW YOU LEAVE: A STUDY OF WITHDRAWAL AND CONFLICT RENEWAL

**A Monograph
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13. ABSTRACT (<i>Maximum 200 Words</i>) The question of whether the conduct of a military withdrawal matters to the renewal of violence is both timely and relevant given U.S. intentions to withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. This monograph uses Dr. Monica Duffy Toft's "mutual benefit and mutual harm" theory on building an enduring peace in concert with doctrinal and theoretical considerations for the conduct of withdrawal as the framework for examining military intervention and subsequent withdrawal in two case studies, the British in Malaya and the U.S. in Vietnam. The case study analysis demonstrates that the conditions you leave after an intervention and the manner in which you leave both matter to the endurance of the peace. A limitation to the benefit/harm theory however, is that regardless of the stability achieved by the intervention and reinforced by the withdrawal, a determined external actor could foil that stability once forces are completely disengaged and the intervener's influence in the state is diminished. This does not change the requirement for military planners to ensure that the benefit/harm mechanisms are appropriately balanced throughout the campaign, and that the exit strategy is deliberate and coherent with the strategic and operational context and remains guided by an interest in stability. Additional considerations offered to inform military operational planning include the employment of metrics for disengagement and the orchestration of the withdrawal in terms of force sizing, capability decline, task reduction and balance, and geographical consolidation.				
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Abstract

It Matters How You Leave: A Study of Withdrawal and Conflict Renewal by MAJ Erica L. Cameron, U.S. Army, 73 pages.

Given the United States intervention in and intent to withdraw from both Iraq and Afghanistan, the question of whether the conduct of a military withdrawal matters to the renewal of conflict is both timely and relevant. Guided by the National Security Strategy, the U.S. is setting the conditions for stability and security in these areas by employing mechanisms consistent with Dr. Monica Duffy Toft's "mutual benefit and mutual harm" theory on building an enduring peace. Her theory balances sharing the benefits of peace and harming the defectors of peace (emphasizing domestic security sector reform over third party intermediaries) in order to mitigate causes of conflict, build stakeholders, and engender self-sufficiency in states experiencing civil conflict.

The benefit/harm model in concert with doctrinal and theoretical considerations for the conduct of withdrawal serve as the framework for examining military intervention and subsequent withdrawal in two case studies, the British in Malaya and the U.S. in Vietnam. The case study analysis demonstrates that the conduct of military disengagement matters in that it can alleviate, ignore or create causes of conflict, and reinforce or undermine the stability mechanisms developed during an intervention. In sum, the conditions you leave after an intervention and the manner in which you leave both matter to the endurance of the peace. A limitation to the benefit/harm theory however, is that regardless of the stability achieved by the intervention and reinforced by the withdrawal, a determined external actor could foil that stability once forces are completely disengaged and the intervener's influence in the state is diminished.

This does not change the requirement for military planners to ensure that the benefit/harm mechanisms are appropriately balanced throughout the campaign, and that the exit strategy is deliberate and coherent with the strategic and operational context and remains guided by an interest in stability. Additional considerations offered to inform operational planning include the employment of metrics for disengagement and the orchestration of the withdrawal in terms of force sizing, capability decline, task reduction and balance, and geographical consolidation.

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Introduction

Over the course of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has modified its military doctrine in an effort to advance the military's counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. *Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency* and *FM 3-07 Stability Operations* reflect these efforts to improve operations and prepare states subject to intervention for post conflict peaceful endurance.

As doctrine incorporates the experience and best practices of how to progress the conditions of a state before the U.S. departs, it is failing to anticipate the other aspect of how the U.S. leaves – the conduct of military disengagement.¹ But does the character of the disengagement matter? Does the manner of withdrawal affect the renewal of violence? If it matters, what considerations are useful in planning for disengagement?

These are timely and relevant questions given U.S. entanglements abroad and historical precedents of non-occupation. The President of the United States has indicated that over the next 12-18 months U.S. troops will begin to withdraw from both Iraq and Afghanistan having set the conditions for stability and security.² Commanders and staffers are actively planning for the transition of operations to host nation governments and security forces as well as the redeployment of troops and equipment. The art of integrating and synchronizing these activities

¹ For the purposes of this paper, the terms disengagement and withdrawal are used when referring to military operations that create conditions for military forces to depart from an operation and return to a pre-conflict/contingency posture that is conducive to future operations and deterrence. This is derived from *FM 3-0 Operations* and *Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3 Peace Operations* which use withdrawal in the context of departing from an operation and MAJ Kleisner's monograph "Disengagement Operations: Context, Violence, and Spoilers in a New Phase IV Construct" which nests the operational departure within the broader strategic security interest. Department of the Army U.S., *Field Manual 3-0 Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Feb 2008); Department of Defense U.S., *Joint Publication 3-07.3 Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Oct 2007); MAJ Theodore W. Kleisner II, "Disengagement Operations: Context, Violence, and Spoilers in a New Phase IV Construct" (Master's thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010).

² Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq" (speech presented at The White House Oval Office, Washington, D.C., August 31, 2010), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq> (accessed September 20, 2010).

to enable disengagement is highly complex. For the operation to be successful, the withdrawal must be conducted in such a manner as to not threaten or undermine the systems of stability that the U.S. has spent nearly a decade building.³

The plan to withdraw military forces from any operation, sometimes termed an exit strategy, is based principally on a political decision to disengage, supported by best military advice and informed by the state of the intervention on the ground and the domestic and international state of affairs.⁴ Dr. David Edelstein in his paper entitled “Exit Strategies,” explains that states will opt for different exit strategies based on domestic pressures such as the need for victory, cost, and international factors such as saving face, and demonstrating resolve/preserving reputation.⁵ Disengagement succeeds when political and military expressed strategic aims are achieved, and the conflict does not require reengagement.⁶ Note that strategic goals may change over time based on how the intervention unfolds and how tolerance for post-intervention conflict fluctuates in the target state over time and circumstances.

In addition to the theoretical discussion of exit strategies, Joint and Army doctrine have addressed the idea of ending military intervention by including termination criteria, end state, and conditions as elements of operational design, by phasing stability and transition operations after

³ Kleisner, “Disengagement Operations,” abstract. This thesis provides a detailed discussion on the relevance of withdrawal. MAJ Kleisner argues that the “U.S. Armed Forces has a long and rich history of expeditionary operations followed by military disengagements. For the U.S. Armed Forces to remain responsive to global demands in the future, its leaders must understand military disengagement operations so that they can successfully extricate scarce combat power from global operations as quickly as strategically and operationally practicable.”

⁴ David Edelstein, “Exit Strategies: When, How, and Why Do States End Military Interventions” (lecture presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, March 2008), 7.
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apr_research_citation/2/5/0/7/2/pages250722/p250722-1.php (accessed July 10, 2010).

⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁶ Point reinforced by MAJ Kleisner. He states that “a military disengagement succeeds when it accompanies the achievement of strategic goals and ensures that the conflict does not revert to a state that requires reengagement.” Kleisner, “Disengagement Operations,” 15.

decisive operations, and by addressing the mechanics of redeployment.⁷ However, doctrine offers little to guide the process of disengagement other than the standardized mission planning processes informed by operational art and design.⁸ This is insufficient if the character of the withdrawal of forces after an intervention or occupation affects the propensity for renewal of violence - violence that could require the U.S. or another third party to intervene again in the future.

This monograph proposes that all operations from deployment to redeployment are overlapping, interdependent and only artificially structured by phases and transitions. It follows that every aspect of the intervention together in concert affects the outcome of the conflict, which implies that the conduct of withdrawal has the potential to alter critically the course of stability and peace after prolonged intervention or occupation. As such, disengagement must be executed within the operational context as methodologically as other types of missions.

Given the extent of national treasure and human lives expended in resolving conflicts and the synchronous nature of operations, it is a worthwhile effort to expound on withdrawal planning. This monograph attempts to gain insight into disengagement by building upon a theoretical model of peacebuilding with considerations for withdrawal.

To lay the foundation for withdrawal it is useful to address peacebuilding and optimizing the stability of the target state. While the U.S. typically has specific interests in the outcome of

⁷ *FM 3-0 Operations* and *JP 3-0 Joint Operations* define and describe the elements of operational design. *FM 3-0*, Chapter 6; Department of Defense U.S., *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Feb 2008), Chapter IV. *FM 3-0* and *JP 3-0* also discuss operational phasing and provide notional phasing constructs for full spectrum operations and for campaigns. *FM 3-0*, 3-21; *JP 3-0*, IV-26. *JP 3-0* briefly describes redeployment. *JP 3-0*, V-28 - V-29.

⁸ *FM 5-0 The Operations Process* describes the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) as the operations planning process utilized by the U.S. Army. Department of the Army U.S., *Field Manual 5-0 The Operations Process* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Mar 2010). The Joint version of MDMP is the Joint Operation Planning Process. Department of Defense U.S., *Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Dec 2006). Both processes are generalized for effective planning given any kind of operation. Additional considerations for planning under specific circumstances lay in the larger family of doctrine. However, planning withdrawal is noticeably absent from both Army and Joint doctrine.

any given intervention, one of the overarching desires is to help other countries govern and secure their territory, thus generating greater stability and resiliency in their respective states so they can participate as functional sovereign entities and partners in the international community.⁹

Secretary of Defense Bill Gates views this as a critical element of our National Security Strategy.¹⁰ To achieve stability, a variety of economic, military and political capability and capacity building efforts are employed during intervention to mitigate the underlying causes of conflict and build sustainable conflict resolution and peace enforcement mechanisms. These ideas are included in U.S. Army and Joint counterinsurgency, stability, and peacebuilding manuals.¹¹

Dr. Monica Duffy Toft indirectly supports these central ideas of the U.S. National Security Strategy in her book *Securing the Peace, The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*. She suggests that a system of stability is most sustainable when characterized by “mutual benefit and mutual harm” in which parties achieve settlement through delivery or sharing of benefits with a credible guarantee or threat to harm or punish defectors of peace.¹² Her description of mutual benefit, the sharing of benefits, complements the U.S. goal of governance by addressing ways to mitigate the causes of conflict and build the means to resolve ongoing and future conflicts. The other aspect of mutual harm, the credible threat to defectors of peace, addresses the goal of enabling countries to secure themselves by building the domestic security sector in a way to both

⁹ President of the United States, *National Security Strategy* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2010), 26.

¹⁰ Robert Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves, The Future of U.S. Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 3. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robert-m-gates/helping-others-defend-themselves> (accessed July 10, 2010).

¹¹ Army Doctrine includes: Department of the Army U.S., *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Dec 2006); Department of the Army U.S., *Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Oct 2008); and Department of the Army U.S., *Field Manual 3-07.31 Peace Ops, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Oct 2008). Joint Doctrine includes: Department of Defense U.S., *Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Oct 2009); and Department of Defense U.S., *JP 3-07 Peace Operations*.

¹² Monica Duffy Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2,17.

share power and enforce the terms of peace. Dr. Toft's argument for a blended mutual benefit/mutual harm strategy for building an enduring peace parallels the logic that supports the current U.S. National Security Strategy and U.S. military doctrine, and provides a useful contemporary model of peacebuilding on which to build.¹³ As such, it provides the foundation on which this monograph tests the hypothesis that the conduct of a military withdrawal after an intervention matters to the renewal of violence.

To maximize the utility of the model, the first section of the literature review provides a detailed review of Dr. Toft's theory. It introduces the key terms of conflict and conflict resolution, delves into the professional discourse on causes of conflict and conflict recurrence, summarizes her findings on types of war termination and their correlated outcomes with respect to conflict recurrence and long term political and economic progress, and offers insights into the broader context, relevance, and utility of her theory. A thorough understanding of her work informs the remainder of the paper, which will utilize the mutual harm/mutual benefit theory as the foundation for evaluating the achievement of stability in an operational context.

The next section of the literature review surveys disengagement doctrine and theory to introduce and expand on some contemporary thoughts and considerations specific to the conduct of withdrawal. This section provides an initial lexicon by which to evaluate the planning and conduct of a withdrawal examined in the case studies. The methodology describes the case selection as well as the limitations of the study.

Two case studies, the British intervention in Malaya and the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, are then analyzed under the rubric of the benefit/harm model and withdrawal considerations using the terms and concepts introduced in the literature review. A cursory evaluation is offered on whether an enduring stability was achieved or was even achievable by

¹³ President, *National Security Strategy*, 26-27. See section on "Invest in the Capacity of Strong and Capable Partners."

the benefit and harm mechanisms employed in the conflict and how the withdrawal supported or undermined those mechanisms. The cases demonstrate that while the manner of withdrawal matters to the renewal of conflict, it cannot be isolated from the stability conditions established during the intervention.

Finally, the conclusion attempts to capture and summarize the insights gained from the case studies in recommendations for consideration during withdrawal planning, and to identify areas for further study.

Literature Review

Peacebuilding and Stability Model - Toft's Theory of "Mutual Benefit and Mutual Harm"

This paper utilizes Dr. Toft's benefit/harm model as the theoretical basis for discussing stability and analyzing the character of withdrawal from a military conflict. This section provides a detailed overview of her study on civil wars and conflict recurrence, explains how it fits into the broader set of literature on these topics, and discusses the relevance and utility of her theory.

In her book, *Securing the Peace*, Dr. Toft seeks to "establish a significant correspondence between the nature of a civil war's termination and long-term political, social, and economic outcomes" and "also to introduce a general explanation for that pattern, which might inform better policy and, by extension, reduce the frequency or intensity of civil war recurrence."¹⁴ Through quantitative analysis and qualitative case studies, Dr. Toft challenges the assumptions driving international conflict resolution and describes how peacemaking and peacekeeping through negotiated settlement and third party guarantees may in fact prolong civil wars.¹⁵ As an alternative, she introduces the strategy of "mutual benefit and mutual harm" as a mechanism for

¹⁴ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 150.

¹⁵ Dr. Toft uses quantitative analysis to challenge the assumptions prevalent in conflict resolution literature that correlate negotiated settlements and third party guarantees to lasting peace and economic and political progress.

the durable settlement of civil wars. The theory “provides in the first place a credible threat of harm or punishment to those who defect from the treaty and in the second place a credible delivery of benefits.”¹⁶ As previously stated, this theory is consistent with the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy and serves as the model applied in the case study analysis.

Key Terms

Dr. Toft uses terms specific to her analysis of durable conflict settlement. This section summarizes her key terms which will be respected throughout this monograph and provides an overview of how they relate to peacebuilding, stability and conflict resolution.¹⁷

*Civil War:*¹⁸ A fight that occurs within the boundaries of an internally recognized state involving at least two sets of organized combatants (one of which is the state or government) with the capacity to physically harm one another. Genocide is not considered civil war in this analysis. Additionally, there “must be a substantial number of deaths over a defined period”, with a

¹⁶ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 17.

¹⁷ Dr. Toft’s use of terminology is generally consistent within the field of peacebuilding, stability, and conflict resolution. Other complementary or contrasting views are captured in footnotes.

¹⁸ As used in this study, “civil war” conflates civil conflict (which could manifest as a conventional conflict) with insurgency (typically executed using unconventional weapons and tactics), disallowing any differentiation between the two in the data and analysis. However, differentiation is evident in U.S. military doctrine. While doctrine does not define “civil war” or “conventional warfare”, it does address insurgency as a unique type of conflict because of its irregular qualities that require an other than conventional response. *JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency* defines insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority” and counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.” *JP 3-24*, I-1. Dr. Toft’s analysis does not accommodate this discrimination between conventional and unconventional warfare and/or response to civil conflict. She is not unique in her approach to civil war classification. Stathis N. Kalyvas, another civil war theorist, also conflates the concepts in his analysis of civil wars. Kalyvas defines civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities.” He follows this by acknowledging that “by this definition, most revolutions, sustained peasant insurrections, “revolutionary” or ethnic insurgencies, anticolonial uprisings, and resistance wars against foreign occupiers are civil wars.” Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (*Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics*) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17-19. This fairly common classification of civil war is useful for simplifying post conflict analysis, but not for generating an effective military or national response to a crisis.

threshold of 1,000 deaths per year on average.¹⁹ Given this definition, Dr. Toft identifies 130 cases of civil war from 1940 to the present to utilize in her quantitative analysis.

*Military Victory:*²⁰ “Military victories are situations in which one side in a war is defeated, with the other party emerging as the victor.”²¹ The losing side participates in government at the discretion of the victor who also determines the type and composition of the postwar government.²² Dr Toft disaggregates rebel victory and government victory in her analysis to demonstrate different propensities for postwar stability. Empirically, military victory reduces the likelihood of war recurrence because the opposing element is decisively defeated.²³

*Negotiated Settlement:*²⁴ “Negotiated settlement is a shared agreement to end the fighting and an understanding that each party will participate in a future government.”²⁵ They can include provisions about the future composition of the government, elections, disarmament and

¹⁹ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 9-10.

²⁰ Neither U.S. Joint nor Army doctrine define or utilize the term “victory.” The closest phrase is “mission accomplishment” which is used repeatedly concerning achieving the objectives of the operation or campaign, evaluated using criteria of success, which set conditions favorable to U.S. interests.

²¹ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 10.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 55.

²⁴ Negotiated settlements are also referred to as peace agreements in peacebuilding literature and their importance in conflict resolution is generally recognized. Ho-Won Jeong reinforces the idea that in order to achieve a comprehensive and durable peace, agreements must be reached on key reforms that address causes of conflict and lead to broader structural changes. Ho-Won Jeong, *Peacebuilding In Postconflict Societies: Strategy And Process* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). Also Elham Atashi in his essay “Challenges to conflict transformation from the streets” summarizes key theorists’ thoughts on “peace benefits” to highlight the utility of sharing benefits in creating stakeholders and incentivizing peace. Bruce W. Dayton and Louis Kriesberg, eds., *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving From Violence to Sustainable Peace (Routledge Studies in Security and Conflict Management)* (New York: Routledge, 2009). U.S. military doctrine, as described in JP 3-07.3 *Peace Operations*, addresses this process of peacefully arranging an end to a dispute and resolving issues that lead to it as peacemaking operations. In contexts of violence, peace enforcement operations compel compliance with resolutions or agreements. JP 3-07.3, x.

²⁵ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 10.

demobilization of the fighters, refugee repatriation, and issues of justice, human rights, and accountability during the course of the war.²⁶ These factors address grievances and contribute to mutual benefit post conflict. Dr. Toft provides empirical evidence that under negotiated settlements conflicts “not only are more likely to recur than other termination types but are significantly more deadly when they do” and that under agreements the situations trend towards authoritarianism over time and do not lead to greater economic prosperity.²⁷

Ceasefire/Stalemate.²⁸ “Ceasefires/Stalemates involve a common understanding and agreement that the violence must be halted,” but do not aim to establish a permanent cessation of violence.²⁹ Ceasefire agreements do not stipulate a permanent end to hostilities nor details about the postwar environment. Dr. Toft considers this as one of the types of war termination because they do suspend violence, but with the caveat that war could easily reignite and thus are not truly a long term solution.³⁰ Regardless, she empirically shows that ceasefires/stalemates are more stable and lead to more democratic outcomes than negotiated settlements.³¹

²⁶ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 10.

²⁷ Ibid., 52, 61, 62, 64. These correlations are unique to Dr. Toft’s analysis.

²⁸ *JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations* uses the term peacekeeping when referring to military operations, conducted with the consent of the warring parties, that monitor or facilitate implementation of an agreement (such as a ceasefire) and support efforts toward long term settlement. *JP 3-07.3*, x.

²⁹ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 11.

³⁰ Ceasefires may suspend violence between the parties in conflict, but not actually stop in party violence or improve local security. Elham Atashi points out in his essay “Challenges to conflict, transformation from the streets” that “Agreements do not include provisions for dealing with crime and local low-intensity violent activities” which may result in a different pattern of violence that remains below the threshold or outside the provisions of the cease fire agreement. Dayton and Kriesberg, *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding*, 52.

³¹ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 55, 67.

*Third Party Guarantees:*³² While not explicitly defined, Dr. Toft identifies the purpose of third parties to manage fear or insecurity post-conflict by helping “former belligerents overcome their distrust of each other and abide by their commitments to implement and uphold the terms of their agreements.”³³ Dr. Toft challenges the assumption that third parties facilitate success of the negotiated peace and statistically concludes that third-party guarantees have a positive correlation with war recurrence and that security sector reform is more important to long term stability.³⁴

*Benefit:*³⁵ Benefit is a central component to Dr. Toft’s strategy for enduring peace and signifies “political (in terms of both offices and survival) and economic benefits” that result after civil war termination. Benefit is concerned with “who and how many actors will benefit and by how much?”³⁶ Sharing and distributing benefits, evident in cases of negotiated settlements and military victory by rebels, contribute to stability of the peace because more people have a stake in the new system.

³² Those countries performing the function of third party guarantees are sometimes referred to as “intermediaries” in peacebuilding literature. Bruce W. Dayton cites in his essay “Useful but insufficient, Intermediaries in peacebuilding” that “intermediaries are generally regarded as parties who intervene in disputes for the purpose of influencing or facilitating a settlement, but who do not take sides in the conflict.” In his conclusions, Dayton acknowledges the possibility that intermediaries may have no impact or be counterproductive to conflict resolution, which allows space for Dr. Toft’s findings that third party guarantees are positively correlated with conflict recurrence. Dayton and Kriesberg, *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding*, 61, 71. Note that intermediaries as defined here are different from a third party that intervenes on behalf of one side in a conflict as will manifest in the case studies.

³³ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 30.

³⁴ Ibid., 59-60.

³⁵ Peace benefits are used in negotiating settlements as incentives to entice parties into agreements, create stakeholders among the factions, and lock groups into a commitment to peace. Third parties can offer additional diplomatic and economic incentives that lie beyond the immediate parties in conflict. Dayton and Kriesberg, *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding*, 47.

³⁶ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 42.

*Harm:*³⁷ The other central tenet of Dr. Toft's strategy and denotes "how much peace might cost various actors and what the costs of defection from a peace treaty might be?" or what will be the punishments for taking up arms again?³⁸ Generally speaking harm refers to the ability to secure the peace. The greater the threat of harm, which Dr. Toft attributes to military victory or domestic security sector reform, the more stable the peace becomes.

*Security Sector Reform:*³⁹ Dr. Toft advocates security sector reform (SSR) to generate the credible threat of harm central to her strategy for enduring peace. The security sector "refers to institutions that have the authority over the threat of force or use force to protect the state and civilians."⁴⁰ The "ultimate goal of SSR is governance and, at a minimum, the ability to maintain order through the use of force, if necessary" which includes "the military, paramilitary groups, the local police, and other organizations that support the policy in "delivering accessible justice (judiciary and penal system), intelligence, customs enforcement, and the civil management and oversight authorities."⁴¹ Dr. Toft empirically establishes that inclusion of SSR as part of a

³⁷ Enforcing the peace and establishing a secure environment is viewed in the civilian peacebuilding community as a necessary condition for stability and development. Many theorists in peace studies advocate the use of third party peacekeepers (such as the United Nations) in this role. Dr. Toft however advocates that states resource, reform, and empower their own domestic security forces to perform this responsibility.

³⁸ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 43.

³⁹ Chapter 6 of *FM 3-07 Stability Operations* focuses specifically on the issue of security sector reform. It defines SSR as "the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides for safety, security, and justice" and identifies the security sector as critical and necessary to building legitimate, effectively governed states. The chapter then discusses in detail the elements of the security sector (similar to Toft's), the military role in SSR, and provides guidance for the planning and facilitation of SSR and DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.) *FM 3-07*, 6-1 – 6-22.

⁴⁰ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 12.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 12, 43.

settlement and the successful implementation of SSR reduces the likelihood of renewal of violence.⁴²

Enduring Peace.⁴³ Peace is “a cessation of violence” and “a general lack of willingness to pursue economic, political, or social objectives by means of violence.”⁴⁴ Enduring peace “means not only peace that lasts a long time, but also peace that holds the possibility of an improved quality of life for all survivors of a civil war.”⁴⁵ Dr. Toft challenges the notion that achievement of short term peacebuilding goals is indicative of long term stability or democratization by showing quantitative political (polity scores) and economic (per capita GDP) trends over 20 years based on type of war termination.

Challenging Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Literature

Dr. Toft assesses theory and practice in her search for a suitable strategy for securing durable peace after Civil Wars. In her review of professional study, she challenges literature on what constitutes a typical negotiated settlement, explanations for civil war recurrence, and outcomes of negotiated settlement and military victory and how they relate to democratic consolidation and economics.

Statistically, negotiated settlements have become increasingly common since 1940.⁴⁶ “An examination of postwar negotiated settlements confirms that behind the immediate goal of halting

⁴² Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 59.

⁴³ Ho Won Jeong offers another definition: “sustainable peace can be defined as a collective good to redress the past legacy of violent conflict, helping the population overcome extreme vulnerability and move toward self-sufficiency.” Jeong, *Peacebuilding In Postconflict Societies*, 21. *FM 3-07 Stability Operations* states “Peace becomes sustainable when the sources of conflict have been reduced to such an extent that they can be largely managed by developing host-nation institutions.” *FM 3-07*, 1-6.

⁴⁴ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 11.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

violence, the objective of most such settlements is to establish a solid, representative set of institutions with power shared between warring factions.”⁴⁷ Her analysis indicates that emphasis in these settlements has traditionally focused on demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration of armed forces (DDR) at the expense of SSR.⁴⁸ She criticizes this approach by citing recent experiences and reports from international development organizations that identify SSR as crucial to development and preventing violent conflict.⁴⁹ Dr. Toft advocates that SSR is essential to generating a credible threat of harm to defectors of the peace and must be integral to negotiated settlements.

She criticizes the field of literature on civil war recurrence for focusing on negotiated settlements (which tend to be unsuccessful), and for failure to examine longer-term consequences of civil war.⁵⁰ Negotiated settlements fail because they frequently do not resolve the underlying causes of conflict. She generalizes the numerous theories on the causes of civil war to conflict over resources (schools of grievance and greed) and fear/insecurity, recognizing that all may become contributing factors to ongoing violence once the war begins.⁵¹ While negotiated settlements may address grievance by redistributing resources, they are insufficient in undermining greed or alleviating long-term insecurity – which is critical to long-lasting solutions to civil war.⁵²

⁴⁷ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 19.

⁴⁸ *FM 3-07 Stability Operations* explains DDR’s supporting role to SSR in increasing the stability of the security environment by appropriately scoping the armed forces to the state’s security requirements. When done well, it contributes to SSR and sustainable peace. When done poorly, it can “stall SSR, disrupt peace processes, and socially and economically destabilize communities.” *FM 3-07*, 6-19.

⁴⁹ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 20-24. She cites examples from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Development Programme.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁵¹ Causes of conflict are discussed in detail under the section “Elaboration of the Model.”

⁵² Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 26.

Dr. Toft continues her examination of negotiated settlements by discussing three explanations that illuminate why they fail.⁵³ She argues that flawed terms of settlement are not solely responsible for failure because enforcement mechanisms are equally important and underestimated fears can weaken the terms.⁵⁴ Spoilers who gain more from war than peace are a key reason for resumption of violence, but efforts to coerce or induce them in agreements make them more insecure and greedier.⁵⁵ Third party guarantees or external balancing of power have little impact on the likelihood of successful settlement because belligerent forces will use negotiation to recoup, third parties are reluctant to commit forces, and timetables emphasize short-term goals over long term stability.⁵⁶ Dr. Toft acknowledges that scholars have done well in explaining specific cases of civil war recurrence and stability, but asserts they do not generally explain success or failure of negotiated settlement nor do they address cases of military victory.⁵⁷

Compared to negotiated settlements, military victories correlate more often with enduring peace. Dr. Toft identifies and challenges the two main explanations for this trend. First, complete destruction of one party by the other resulting in peace, while logical, is empirically rare.⁵⁸ Second, military conflict in itself exposes the balance of power between the parties to which the weaker side accepts defeat.⁵⁹ However frequently it does not, so attempts are made to pursue

⁵³ Additional discussion on why agreements fail and conflict recurs follows in the section “Elaboration of the Model.”

⁵⁴ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 28.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 30.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 32.

⁵⁷ Dr. Toft asserts that theorists have not provided a general theory for war recurrence and stability. Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 32. Research within the civil war recurrence and stability fields indicates that while some thought has been applied in these areas, no general model or theory explains their outcomes. Dr Toft’s harm/benefit theory attempts to do so.

⁵⁸ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 33.

⁵⁹ In some cases, the weaker side will start or continue to fight for the purposes of forcing recognition of their grievances, improving their position for negotiating, or gaining time to generate support.

stability through negotiated separation and partition or intervention to establish equilibrium.⁶⁰ But these efforts do not resolve the root causes of conflict to include fear and animosity, are durable only with enforcement, and tax finite international will and resources.⁶¹

Dr. Toft then turns to the literature of democratic consolidation and economics to establish connections between war termination, institution building (including SSR), and prospects for democracy and stability.⁶² She asserts that decisive military victory allows for rapid transition of institutions creating greater prospects for democracy, and that unchallenged control over resources, security, and agenda by a unified actor prevents emergence of violence.⁶³ In contrast, negotiated settlements divide the state's assets (generating benefits), but this delays transition and inhibits development of democratic institutions, and most do not assess nor attempt to reform the security sector necessary for long term stability.⁶⁴ Her theory of mutual benefit/mutual harm attempts to harness the positive aspects of military victory and negotiated settlement to improve political and economic prospects.

The Mechanics Behind the Model

Dr. Toft's study includes the empirical analysis of 130 cases of civil war terminations between 1940 and 2000.⁶⁵ She uses statistical analysis to assess correlation of: the type of termination (military victory, negotiated settlement, cease fire/stalemate) in relation to the

⁶⁰ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 34. This type of intervention by military forces, falls in the realm of peace keeping or peace enforcement. *JP* 3-07.3, x.

⁶¹ Ibid., 35. Ho-Won Jeong reinforces this idea stating, "Success in peace enforcement function, in particular, relies on the credibility of deterrence and the political will of the intervener." Jeong, *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies*, 55.

⁶² Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 40.

⁶³ Ibid., 40-41.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 41, 43.

⁶⁵ For explanations regarding methodology formulation in political science, see: Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, 3 ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008) or Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1997).

durability of the peace; “between different types of outcomes in relation to longer-term changes in levels of autocracy and democracy, as well as economic growth, over two decades”; and “whether reforms to the security sector provide a plausible alternative to third-party guarantees in relation to war recurrence.”⁶⁶

In presenting her empirical tests, Dr. Toft challenges previous large sample studies conducted that display less correlation between war termination and recurrence than her findings. She accounts for this by citing differences in coding, which affected inclusion and exclusion of cases (based on categorization of negotiated settlements, conflict intensity thresholds, and inclusion of wars of independence) and aggregation/disaggregation of certain conflicts.⁶⁷

She then uses “a series of qualitative case studies to assess further the causal logic of her argument regarding durable peace following civil war,” including security sector reform and the need for a balance of harm and benefit, set against historical evidence.⁶⁸ Her case studies of three countries and four cases “include variation on both independent (type of termination) and dependent (recurrence) variables.”⁶⁹ She bounds her qualitative study by not including cases that involved third parties intermediaries or cases of cease-fire/stalemates. This paper extends the application of her benefit/harm theory to cases involving third party interventions that involved building stability and security mechanisms to end civil conflict.

The Central Logic Behind the Benefit/Harm Theory

In contrast to the belief that negotiated settlements improve the chances for peace, Dr. Toft’s analysis concludes that of the types of civil war termination, those ended by military victory are more likely to achieve a durable peace. Durability is achieved because the opposition

⁶⁶ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 14.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 57-58.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 14.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 15.

has been defeated and the remaining survivors on the losing side face a credible guarantee of harm if they renew violence.⁷⁰ Of the cases, “military victories by rebels tend to be far more stable” because the victors not only possess the credible threat of harm, but they also seek to share benefits in order to gain domestic and international acceptance and legitimacy.⁷¹ As such, rebel victories lead to the greatest levels of democratization in the long term.⁷² In sum, military victories are strong in terms of promise of harm, but weaker in their promise of benefits or incentives, but are overall more stable than negotiated settlements or ceasefire/stalemates.⁷³

In comparison to military victories, Dr. Toft finds that “negotiated settlements are more likely to break down, resulting in renewed (and at times escalated) violent conflict,” providing evidence that violence is twice as likely to reignite.⁷⁴ While settlements do generally facilitate sharing of benefits, they lack “credible guarantee to harm or punish defectors should one or more of the contracting parties renege on its commitments” because they typically stress demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR) in lieu of reconstituting and reforming security institutions (SSR).⁷⁵ Negotiated settlements are therefore “vulnerable to cheating or to tactical cease-fires in which one or all parties simply use the respite to rearm in hopes of achieving original or expanded political objectives.”⁷⁶ Empirical data indicates “negotiated settlements are more likely to be associated with increasing levels of authoritarianism as more time passes.”⁷⁷ While settlements do provide benefits, they do not provide for the provision of harm and may not be the best way to facilitate democratic outcomes.

⁷⁰ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 2, 3.

⁷¹ Ibid., 4, 47.

⁷² Ibid., 37.

⁷³ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 2, 9.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 19, 37.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 64.

Dr. Toft argues “that both negotiated settlements and military victories contain the key elements necessary for endurance, but also that neither of these by itself is sufficient to achieve this important aim.”⁷⁸ She concludes “it is both possible and necessary to develop a hybrid strategy for ending civil wars in a constructive manner, one that incorporates the strengths of both the negotiated settlement and military victory termination profiles.”⁷⁹ Her response is the theory or strategy of “mutual benefit, mutual harm” – sharing benefits or incentives while deterring defection with threat of harm.

Dr. Toft concludes that “Security Sector Reform (SSR) offers the potential for both enduring and constructive peace” because it builds the state’s repressive capacity to punish defection by reconstituting and training the military and police and integrating former rebels as part of the security solution.⁸⁰ She demonstrates through empirical evidence that SSR reduces the likelihood of recurrence of violence following negotiated agreement, while third-party guarantees may actually increase the probability of recurrence.⁸¹ As such, “security is the primary (but not the only) sector demanding reform and resources following a civil war. If SSR is done well, then a negotiated settlement can take on all the positive attributes of an outright military victory (e.g., durability of peace) without having to absorb all of the associated costs (e.g., reignition and political repression).”⁸² When governments exercise a credible threat of harm and the promise of benefit in the right balance they can deter and appease potential opponents, laying the foundation for a self-sustaining, enduring peace.⁸³

⁷⁸ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 36.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 19, 37.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 50.

⁸³ *Ibid.* The hybrid strategy that Dr. Toft advocates is the same logic that the National Security Strategy and the U.S. military uses in its approach to nation building and stability operations. SSR is recognized as a time and resource heavy endeavor that is necessary for long-term peace and stability.

Elaboration, Relevance, and Utility

In an effort to be parsimonious and simple, Dr. Toft uses a limited set of factors to explain a broader phenomenon in crafting a general theory of civil war termination and durable peace.⁸⁴ She advocates a strategy of mutual benefit and mutual harm (supported by SSR) to prevent the renewal of conflict after a civil war. Her theory attempts to harness the stability and security of military victory with the shared benefits achieved through negotiation. The simplicity of her argument and the empirical evidence is compelling. However, for someone not educated in conflict studies and peacebuilding, it is worthwhile to discuss some foundational concepts before addressing the relevance and utility of Dr. Toft's model.

Elaboration of the Model

The theory of enduring peace through mutual benefit/mutual harm is built on foundational concepts from the fields of civil war, war termination, peace building, and conflict renewal. Understanding these concepts is instrumental to the application of her model. While Dr. Toft simplifies the causes of war and conflict renewal and focuses on a single independent variable (type of war termination) to explain conflict recurrence, underlying her theory is the knowledge that conflict is complex, multi-causal, multi-dimensional and over-determined.⁸⁵ A broad and dynamic spectrum of contributing factors and interactions among them generate conditions for conflict. Resources (greed and grievance) and fear/insecurity are commonly used to simplify the experience.

Emphasizing SSR early in the peace process contradicts much of the peacebuilding literature that focuses on near to midterm objectives of halting the conflict, objectives in which DDR is the principal concern.

⁸⁴ Toft, *Securing the Peace*, xi.

⁸⁵ Dr. David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc, 2002), 115, 260; Conflict, Governance and Social Development Resource Center, <http://www.gsdr.org/index.cfm?objectid=3131970C-14C2-620A-27D76FE6C7549390> (accessed August 25, 2010).

A literature review for factors contributing to conflict, thus shaping the greed/grievance and insecurity generalization, identifies a variety of types of causes (economic, political, environmental, ethnic) and a multitude of contributing causes of conflict.⁸⁶ The chart to follow is organized using Mr. Smith's types of causes with specific contributory factors derived from conflict literature.⁸⁷ The list is not all-inclusive as each conflict is unique and driven by the interaction of tangible greed/grievance and insecurity issues embedded within the larger context of values, beliefs, identities and cultures.⁸⁸ As Mr. Smith articulates, there are "very many sufficient conditions [for war] of which only a few of these may apply in any single conflict" and most important is how the causes interact.⁸⁹ Beyond these causes of war, Collier and Hoeffler's economic model of civil war argues that these conditions do not lead to war per se without the opportunity to organize and finance a rebellion.⁹⁰ Leadership could also be an essential factor in mobilizing for conflict.

⁸⁶ Dan Smith, "Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict," Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 8. http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/smith_handbook.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010). In this source, Mr. Smith classifies background causes of conflict in these general categories. Mr. Smith is world renowned for his research and prolific literature in the fields of conflict and peace studies. A detailed biography is available at http://www.international-alert.org/about/about_us.php?t=1.

⁸⁷ This chart compiled by the author from a multitude of texts and online sources, see bibliography. Ronald J. Glossop argues that causes of conflict be viewed in the sense of contributory factors to war, as no single factor is necessary and sufficient to cause war. Ronald J. Glossop, *Confronting War, An Examination of Humanity's Most Pressing Problem*, 3rd ed. (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1994), Chapter IV.

⁸⁸ Michelle Maiese, "Causes of Disputes and Conflicts," Beyond Intractability, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/underlying_causes/ (accessed August 24, 2010).

⁸⁹ Dan Smith, "Trends and Causes," 5.

⁹⁰ Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, *Understanding Civil War Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions: Evidence and Analysis*, Vol 2 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2005), xiii.

Economic	Political/Social
Poverty Poor economy Stratified society Distribution of wealth State economic intervention Resource exploitation Land distribution	Internal disorder Sense of military superiority Ideologies – clash of beliefs Leadership/Egos Political centralization Inequality, exclusion, marginalization Weak state institutions Repression Dissatisfaction with government Social-psychological Fear of being attacked (paranoia)
Environmental	Ethnic
Environmental damage Resource scarcity Urbanization	Ethnic differences Nationalism Ethnic Politicization Radicalization

Conflict and attempts at conflict resolution may eliminate, breed or exacerbate these causes of conflict and lead to recurrence. Elaborating on this idea, the renewal of conflict may be influenced by other factors, to include: the attributes of the nation and post conflict environment (level of democratization, internal disorder, militarization of politics, economic prosperity, social dynamics); the outcome, duration, and deadliness of the civil war itself; sense of antagonism or revenge with a history of violent confrontation; or the tolerance or incapacity to suppress dual sovereignty (continued existence of opposing groups contending for control over the government.)⁹¹ Mr. Smith states that conflict may also resume based on the sincerity/insincerity of the negotiating parties; disappointment by one or both parties to the conditions of the peace; internal disagreement and fragmentation within the parties to the negotiation; or if the agreement was purely cosmetic without addressing the underlying causes of conflict.⁹² Dr. Toft's approach

⁹¹ This is a compiled list of causes from the following sources: James F. Dunnigan and William Martel, *How to Stop A War, The Lessons of Two Hundred Years of War and Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 27-38; Dayton and Kriesberg, *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding*, 5; T. David Mason, *Sustaining the Peace After Civil War* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), iii, 42; Maiese, "Causes of Disputes and Conflicts."

⁹² Smith, "Trends and Causes," 4.

to conflict and renewal is simplistic but generally accounts for contributing factors to the intractability of conflict.

Dr. Toft's emphasis on mutual harm and security sector reform clearly places her in the "security first" school of peace building – a school which prioritizes security and safety as the necessary element for transformation to peace.⁹³ While there are no master variables for constructing peace, the "security first" school would argue that security may not be sufficient, but it is certainly necessary to create the conditions for additional positive peace building efforts. Dr. Toft's approach lies between the minimalist or negative peace approach (no renewed conflict) and maximalist or positive peace approach (addressing the root causes of conflict.)⁹⁴

Her middle ground strategy combines negative actions (institutionalizing the means to punish defectors) and positive actions (sharing benefits with specific attention to remaking security institutions.) Her strategy advocates for SSR in balance with other positive peacebuilding macro changes (development, governance, human rights and equality, rule of law) that also may contribute towards the uncertain path to peace. She acknowledges that an overemphasis on security programs and building a strong security sector could in fact undermine or suppress positive peace building measures by concentrating military or constabulary power if it is not integrated into a broader peace strategy. Dr. Toft does not detail specific recommendations regarding positive peacebuilding measures.

Relevance and Utility

Dr. Toft's strategy of mutual benefit/mutual harm requires that both elements be present for an enduring peace to take root and mature, but that is the extent of her formula. This has drawbacks, but also significant benefits.

⁹³ Dayton and Kriesberg, *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding*, 56.

⁹⁴ Thematic Areas, Peace Building Initiative, <http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1682> (accessed August 25, 2010).

Her quantitative analysis focuses on the presence or absence of benefit/harm characteristics using binary indicators or proxies. Her case studies go beyond the data to provide some qualitative and historical examples of the positive and negative correlations that support her findings. While her theory is constructive because it acknowledges the roles and importance of both benefit sharing and punishment for defectors to establishing an enduring peace, it does little beyond that. She cites how benefit and harm may manifest themselves in practice, but simply ensuring that aspects of both are present in post conflict environments is not sufficient. Her theory entails that an optimal balance of both, appropriate for a given context, is necessary but does not stipulate how to determine what this looks like nor how to achieve it. Conflict results when you get it wrong, stability when you get it right.

While this vagueness is a valid concern for any practitioner of conflict resolution and peace building, the theory is relevant and useful in its basic formulaic simplicity. The strategy does not prescribe detailed solutions for conflict resolution, its power lies in its simplicity. Conflict resolution theorists generally concur that no strategy or set of strategies can universally apply to all conflicts because of the unique conditions, causes, and perceptions involved in each. The broadness of her theory sets a general course for establishing enduring peace (benefit + harm emphasizing SSR = enduring peace) while maximizing opportunity for novelty, flexibility and adaptability by not being overly prescriptive. The mutual benefit/mutual harm strategy acts as a guide, not a straightjacket, to policy or implementation.

Dr. Toft's theory or formula for enduring peace is founded on the requirement that mutual benefit acts in concert with credible mutual harm. The increasing trend toward negotiation and third party guarantees in war termination has emphasized the sharing of benefits with a loose and failure-prone guarantee of harm to defectors of the peace. The enforcer of the mutual harm has typically been an external actor that may or may not service their obligation depending on their national and international interests, and may or may not be an unbiased party. To mitigate the risks of third parties opting out of peace keeping commitments and creating shortfalls to

mutual harm, Dr. Toft endorses the reform and development of sustainable and credible domestic security forces to enforce the peace. This emphasis on SSR separates her strategy or formula from the bulk of peace building literature and what she cites as unsuccessful practice which has focused on DDR and external guarantees.

Finally, Dr. Toft uses qualitative historical case studies to illuminate how these elements of benefit and harm manifest or fail to manifest, how they are used to complement or balance each other, and relates them to the success of the peace. In doing so she illustrates not only the foundation for her theory, but also demonstrates a useful method to deconstruct and assess other historical examples of conflict resolution. To take this one step further, after analyzing a case primarily through the lens of Dr. Toft's theory, it may also be valuable to use this analysis as a basis for assessing whether other particular factors, in this case the conduct of withdrawal, reinforce or disrupt the benefit/harm paradigm and contribute to renewal of violence.

Considerations for the Conduct of Disengagement or Withdrawal

Dr. Toft's theory of "mutual benefit and mutual harm" illuminates how a settlement of conflict may lead to a stable enduring peace. Her analysis addresses the type of conflict termination and the durability of the peace that subsequently follows. She charges that third party guarantors of peace, or intervening forces, generally fail to sustain the peace and as a result domestic security sector reform must be pursued to ensure a long-term guarantee of harm. Dr. Toft does not address the transition between these enforcement mechanisms (from an intermediary in a conflict to a domestic security structure) nor the disengagement of an intervening party. While not considered in the benefit/harm theory, this study on withdrawal posits that the manner of disengagement matters. Dr. Toft's theory provides a useful foundation from which to build a hypothesis on whether and how military disengagement affects the balance of stability and security established during an intervention as seen through the lens of the

benefit/harm model. The case studies will build upon the current literature and doctrine on withdrawal.

A review of discourse on disengagement indicates that withdrawal influences the state and affects the propensity for future recurrence of violence. Within the literature, the consensus on withdrawal is that while damage done during an intervention cannot be undone by a good exit strategy, a successful intervention can be affected by a haphazard exit strategy.⁹⁵ In other words, whatever stability has been generated in the target state by the benefit/harm mechanisms (how you leave it) can be reinforced or undermined by when and how you leave, the manner of the withdrawal. The chart below depicts the assumed relationships derived from this statement, and is supported by the following discussion of withdrawal.

Benefit/Harm	Manner of Withdrawal	
	Deliberate and Coherent (withdrawal consistent with the strategic and operational context, guided by interest in stability)	Haphazard and Incoherent (hasty withdrawal dissociated from stability, guided by other pressures)
Balanced (appropriate balance of benefit/harm mechanisms to resolve/prevent conflict)	(A) Stable, enduring peace (withdrawal reinforces appropriate stability mechanisms)	(B) Uncertain stability (withdrawal disruptive to stability mechanisms)
Imbalanced (benefit/harm mechanisms inappropriate or insufficient to resolve/prevent conflict)	(C) Irreversible damage, conflict renewal (withdrawal supports flawed/inadequate stability mechanisms)	(D) Unabated conflict (neither intervention nor withdrawal established or reinforced appropriate stability mechanisms)

How might withdrawal contribute to a renewal of violence? Disengagement inevitably disrupts whatever conditions are in place and reorients the balance of power within a state. The disruption caused by the withdrawal is influenced by decisions on timing, pace, negotiations and

⁹⁵ Edelstein, "Exit Strategies," 3; and W. Andrew Terrill and Conrad C. Crane, *Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), v-vii. For the purpose of this paper, an intervention/disengagement is successful when it achieves the strategic goals of the intervening state and has set the conditions so the conflict does not require reengagement (either the conflict does not recur or the domestic governing and security apparatus are able to manage it.)

agreements, and whether to leave residual forces.⁹⁶ The conduct of the withdrawal can additionally exasperate existing causes of conflict, contribute to new causes, or shape circumstances for the renewal of violence (see previous discussion of causes of conflict and causes of conflict renewal.) Factors such as non-integrated disengagement, poor management of violence, not addressing spoilers, failure to respond to deterioration and honor commitments, and poor orchestration of the withdrawal can all set the conditions for renewed conflict.

For the purposes of developing a common understanding and lexicon, the following discussion will summarize doctrinal and theoretical considerations for withdrawal.

Withdrawal and Disengagement in Military Doctrine

While the decision to withdraw is political, the achievement of the military objectives and execution of the disengagement and redeployment fall to military planners. Doctrine gives some guidance for ending military operations by including specific elements of operational design. Joint doctrine identifies and defines termination criteria and military end state to guide war termination:⁹⁷

Termination criteria - the specified standards approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. *JP 3-0* also states “Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that achieved military objectives endure.”

Military end state - the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.

Army doctrine cites:

⁹⁶ Edelstein, “Exit Strategies,” 7-19.

⁹⁷ *JP 3-0*, VI-8

End state - at the operational and tactical levels, the conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. At the operational level, these conditions attain the aims set for the campaign or major operation.⁹⁸

The terms are consistently used in the context of providing strategic and operational direction to the practice of operational art to accomplish the mission by explicitly or generally defining the circumstances for the completion of military operations, circumstances that if properly set prevent the renewal of conflict.⁹⁹

Having defined how military operations will end, doctrine then addresses the operational mechanisms to achieve those conditions. Given the intent to facilitate local and regional stability in areas subject to military intervention, doctrine emphasizes stability operations, and enabling and transitioning to civil authority as critical to mission success.¹⁰⁰ They are prerequisite activities or phases before redeployment – at least in cases where the extent of the mission is beyond a rapid raid or strike and/or where the U.S. has enduring interests. This is assumed the case for the remainder of this monograph. Once the desired ends are met, redeployment planning focuses on the mechanics and logistical sequencing of removing personnel and equipment from a theater of operation to best prepare the force for follow on requirements.¹⁰¹

Doctrine addresses the conditions that must be achieved to end military operations (what must be accomplished – end state, conditions), how the military can get it done (how to accomplish it – stability, enabling and transition to civil authority akin to the benefit/harm model), and redeployment (how to get everything back home). However, a gap exists between

⁹⁸ Department of the Army U.S., *Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Sep 2004), 6-7.

⁹⁹ *JP 3-0*, xix. Joint doctrine defines operational art as “the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience to design strategies campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces.” *JP 3-0*, IV-3. Simply put operational art is the arrangement and sequencing of actions in time, space and purpose.

¹⁰⁰ *JP 5-0*, III-9.

¹⁰¹ *JP 3-0*, V-28.

setting or achieving the conditions and logistical redeployment. This gap is the realm of military disengagement or withdrawal, even though it may likely be conducted simultaneously with operations instead of consecutively.

In Joint and Army doctrine, the term withdrawal is defined as “a planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy.”¹⁰² Doctrine uses the term typically in the troop employment sense in conjunction with raid, direct action, and force extraction as a tactical or operational tool to decisively end or avoid an engagement or battle. *FM 3-0 Operations* and *JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations* introduce the term withdrawal in a broader sense concerning setting the conditions to facilitate a timed and phased departure from an operation, but the discussion goes no further.¹⁰³ Within the principal family of Joint and Army doctrine the related term “exit strategy” appears only once in a vignette in *JP 3-0* which mentions consideration of decision points for redeployment.¹⁰⁴

In doctrine the term disengagement is defined in terms of a geographic separation of combatants.¹⁰⁵ However, it is also used in the broader sense of war termination and stability operations in *JP 3-0 Joint Operations*, *FM 3-0 Operations*, and *FM 3-07 Stability Operations*. MAJ Theodore Kleisner II’s May 2010 monograph entitled “Disengagement Operations: Context, Violence, and Spoilers in a New Phase IV Construct” provides a detailed literature review of disengagement in both doctrine and theory. His synthesis of the discourse arrived at a definition for disengagement that is useful for the purpose of this paper. Paraphrasing the key components, disengagement is a military operation that creates conditions for military forces to return to a pre-

¹⁰² *FM 1-02*, 1-199.

¹⁰³ *FM 3-0*, III-8.

¹⁰⁴ *JP 3-0*, VI-11. The principal family of doctrine referred to includes FM and JP series 1.0 through 7.0.

¹⁰⁵ Referenced from: *FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Sep 2004); and *JP 1-02*.

conflict/contingency posture that is conducive to future operations and deterrence.¹⁰⁶ He also stipulates “a military disengagement succeeds when it accompanies the achievement of strategic goals and ensures that the conflict does not revert to a state that requires reengagement.”¹⁰⁷

MAJ Kleisner differentiated disengagement from withdrawal in his paper because withdrawal “seeks to save a military organization from an impending defeat or disaster after which it would likely be impossible to remain engaged in the conflict without a successful counterattack or offensive.”¹⁰⁸ However, this paper uses both disengagement and withdrawal when referring to military operations that create conditions for military forces to depart from an operation and return to a pre-conflict/contingency posture that is conducive to future operations and deterrence. *JP 3-0* and *FM 3-0* use withdrawal in this sense in the context of removing troops and the term is frequently used in this manner in the discourse on exit strategies.

Theoretical Contributions about Withdrawal

The overarching theme of withdrawal is that regardless of how it is executed, military disengagement by an intervening state is unavoidably disruptive to the target state, most significantly because the needs, perceptions, and pressures of the intervener, not those of the target state, principally determine the exit strategy. The decision and plan to disengage are therefore the result of satisficing contending pressures on the intervener in lieu of optimizing the stability of the system which could possibly require more time, money, and resources than the intervener is willing or able to commit.¹⁰⁹ Disengagement is also disruptive because it alters the players and balance of power in the state, and opens the opportunity for competition over control;

¹⁰⁶ Kleisner, “Disengagement Operations,” 6.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 15.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 7.

¹⁰⁹ Edelstein, “Exit Strategies,” 5.

pre-departure agreements cannot be externally enforced and the intervener loses leverage and influence simply because they are no longer present.¹¹⁰

Given that disengagement will disrupt the target state, planning and managing the disengagement is paramount to sustaining the benefit/harm balance attempted during intervention. Discussion on generalized planning considerations of withdrawal is limited, with much of the recent literature in the U.S. focused on context specific (Iraq and Afghanistan) exit strategies. These sources also tend to be strategic and holistic, addressing all elements of national power, instead of focusing on the operational military aspects of withdrawal. Some exceptions to this exist and serve to inform the following considerations for military planning for disengagement.

Exit Strategies – Strategic Choices and Types of Withdrawal

As an exception to the more holistic inquiries into withdrawal, Dr. David Edelstein contributes significantly to the discussion of military disengagement in his lecture paper “Exit Strategies.”¹¹¹ He identifies and generalizes many of the central ideas of withdrawal to include choices that are unique to withdrawal planning. Dr. Edelstein acknowledges four decisions that can inform a military exit strategy, the plan to withdraw military forces. These decisions create dilemmas because the choices can have both positive and negative impacts on the outcome. Therefore, an intervening state must resolve them in a way that does not undermine the stability of the state or region.

The first decision is the methodology or metric to define when to disengage – what is the inflection point when continued military presence confers diminishing returns? When do the costs

¹¹⁰ Edelstein, "Exit Strategies," 35.

¹¹¹ Dr. Edelstein is an associate professor at Georgetown University. His areas of research include military occupations and exit strategies, in which he is a published author. For a detailed biography of his accomplishments, see <http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/dme7/index.html>.

start to exceed the potential benefits? Second is the pace of withdrawal – do you execute a rapid redeployment or a slower deliberate drawdown? Third is pre-withdrawal agreement – do you expend time and resources to pursue a detailed negotiated agreement? Last is residual forces – do you leave residual forces to maintain stability? The positive and negative aspects of each component are summarized in the chart below.¹¹²

Components	Choice	Pro	Con
When to exit	Sooner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reduce costs (human, financial, opportunity) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lose source of leverage and influence - Jeopardize mission accomplishment and stability - Upset balance of power or generate power vacuum - Lose international credibility
	Later	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Retain influence - Improve stability - Manage balance of power - Retain international credibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Diminishing returns - Expensive with opportunity costs
Pace of withdrawal	Rapid	Short term benefits <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fast reduction in costs - Close the intervention - Relieve immediate pressures 	Long term costs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Disruption and instability - Mission failure - Perception of “cut and run” - Damage to reputation
	Slower	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Methodical planning - Troops safer - Possibly more stable - Time for negotiations - Troops provide collateral for agreement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limbo period for troops - Opposition groups wait and posture for departure - Reduction in leverage – know withdrawal is inevitable
Pre-withdrawal agreements	Detailed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opportunity to structure the post intervention state - Bring all parties together - May increase stability - Symbolic value, legitimize the intervention - Signal imminent departure - Improve appearance and perception of intervention to domestic and international audiences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Time intensive, slows pace of withdrawal - Questionable staying power after troops depart - No/little incentive for parties to abide

¹¹² Chart created by author from arguments presented in Dr. Edelstein’s “Exit Strategies” paper. Edelstein, "Exit Strategies," 7-19.

	Less detailed or no agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conserve time, resources, and political capital - No requirement to enforce compliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential damage to credibility/reputation - Negative domestic and international perception of intervention - Loss of legitimacy
Residual Forces	Leave forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Appropriately sized force can facilitate accomplishment of goals - Lower intervener costs - Ally to post-intervention government - Extend stability - Alternatively, use other sources to provide residual forces (United Nations) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stress on remaining units if over tasked - Domestic opposition to partial withdrawal, no definitive end - Post-intervention government may deny residual troop presence, impose restrictions - Could irritate tensions
	Complete withdrawal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - End the intervention - Avoid domestic opposition - Troops available for other contingencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited partnership with post-intervention government - Possible instability

Given these decision components, Dr. Edelstein then summarizes the probable combinations to describe five different types of withdrawal– expeditious withdrawal, phased withdrawal, delayed withdrawal, partial withdrawal, and transitional withdrawal. A brief description and example of each follows:¹¹³

Expeditious withdrawal: Intervener executes quickly paced withdrawal with less emphasis on a pre-withdrawal agreement, also known as the “cut and run” strategy. Example: Somalia 1994.

Phased withdrawal: Intervener executes a prolonged exit with interim troop reductions during which they attempt to negotiate a favorable agreement prior to withdrawal, may include residual forces. Example: U.S. in Vietnam 1969-1973.

Delayed withdrawal: Intervener decides to end an intervention, but delays actually initiating that process, rapid disengagement once initiated. Example: Soviets in Afghanistan 1988.

¹¹³ Edelstein, "Exit Strategies,"19-21.

Partial withdrawal: After a successful intervention, residual forces remain to maintain peace and security after the primary withdrawal. Example: Post World War II Japan and Germany.

Transitional withdrawal: Intervener transfers responsibility for stability and security to another peacekeeping force. Example: U.S. transition of Bosnian mission to the European Union.

Dr. Edelstein's discussion of choices and types offers a logical and structured way to think about withdrawal. Ultimately, the type of withdrawal pursued by political leaders dictates the framework within which the military must disengage.¹¹⁴

Disengagement – Operational Context, Lulls, and Spoilers

Regardless of type of withdrawal pursued, some factors can influence thinking about and planning for disengagement. MAJ Kleisner identifies several of these factors in his monograph entitled "Disengagement Operations: Context, Violence, and Spoilers in a New Phase IV Construct."¹¹⁵ He posits "military organizations can effectively disengage from unconventional wars when they use an appreciation of the operational context to understand how to create and make use of lulls in violence, and manage spoilers."¹¹⁶ He identifies three important considerations: viewing disengagement within the broader operational context, creating and exploiting lulls in violence, and managing the spoilers seeking to thwart stability.

¹¹⁴ *JP 3-35 Deployment and Redeployment Operations* acknowledges "Decisions made concerning the termination of operations, separation of belligerents, withdrawal timetables, residual forces and reserve stocks to remain in the host country will shape the pace and nature of the redeployment." Department of Defense U.S., *JP 3-35 Deployment and Redeployment Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 2007), VII-2. However, beyond traditional planning considerations doctrine offers little with regard to these decisions on withdrawal. Dr. Edelstein's work is helpful in this regard.

¹¹⁵ While not an accomplished scholar, MAJ Kleisner's military experience as an Army officer and research into military disengagement enable him to offer some useful operational considerations for planning a military withdrawal that are unique and not included in current military doctrine.

¹¹⁶ Kleisner, "Disengagement Operations," 2.

An appreciation of the operational context means that disengagement is logically nested and integrated with other operations of the campaign, not seen as independent undertaking.¹¹⁷ Planners cannot artificially separate withdrawal planning from the planning or execution of prior or subsequent activities or operational phases, but should contribute to the overall flow of the campaign. Understanding the operational context also requires knowing the current environment to facilitate the accommodation and adaptation of the plan to the changing conditions of the conflict.¹¹⁸ MAJ Kleisner argues that while the military disengagement from Panama after Operation JUST CAUSE was planned separately from the operation itself, the withdrawal was successful because it adjusted to contextual realities that enabled exploitation of lulls and management of spoilers. An addendum to MAJ Kleisner's discussion on operational context is that disengagement must contribute to the achievement of the strategic and national short and long-term objectives.

An appreciation of the environmental context provides opportunity and options for disengagement. It enables the military commander and planners to create and exploit lulls in violence to generate space for political accommodation and negotiation that set conditions for disengagement.¹¹⁹ MAJ Kleisner cites how the immediate filling of the security vacuum created when U.S. forces toppled the Noriega regime in Panama in 1989 set the conditions for successful disengagement. Taking this one step further beyond MAJ Kleisner's study, exploiting lulls could additionally mean not just stopping the violence altogether, but managing the time, place, target, intensity, and duration of violence to best gain the advantage or set the optimal conditions for stability mechanisms to take root.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Kleisner, "Disengagement Operations," 11.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 11.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 12.

¹²⁰ *FM 3-0 Operations* argues a similar point regarding the management of violence, identifying "creating a secure environment for stability operations" as one purpose of offensive operations and stating

Finally the appreciation of the context enables the military to manage spoilers of the peace – those who profit from continuing conflict or stand to lose power from conflict resolution. MAJ Kleisner’s options for managing spoilers include co-opting them using bribery if they are motivated by greed, socializing them to the political process if they desire concessions, or coercing them with violence or compelling them with the threat or use of force if they cannot be co-opted or socialized.¹²¹ MAJ Kleisner cites the inability of the U.S. and UNOSOM II staff to handle spoilers in Somalia during Operation RESTORE HOPE in 1994 ensured ongoing contest with and between warlords.¹²² While not specifically identified in MAJ Kleisner’s paper, the challenge for military planners is to adopt the appropriate strategy against spoilers at the right time. The strategy must not unintentionally empower and legitimize spoilers through interactions, generate the perception of corruption and favoritism by the distribution of resources, nor militarize politics by temporarily off-setting the balance of internal power and security – all of which could disrupt post intervention stability.

“Stability operations cannot occur if significant enemy forces directly threaten or attack the local populace. Offensive operations destroy or isolate the enemy so stability operations can proceed. Offensive operations against insurgents help keep them off balance. These actions may force insurgents to defend their bases, thus keeping them from attacking.” *FM 3-0*, 3-10.

¹²¹ Kleisner, “Disengagement Operations,” 15. Dr. Toft’s discussion of spoilers in *Securing the Peace* differs slightly from MAJ Kleisner. Dr. Toft uses Stephen Stedman’s definition of “spoiler” as those “committed to prolonging violence and actively work to disrupt both negotiations and peace” who are motivated by greed or insecurity. She argues that coopting spoilers through bribery only makes them greedier and coercing them leaves them more insecure. She concludes that best way to manage spoilers is by curbing their greed and improving security through benefit sharing (socializing) and credible threat of harm (violence or compelling them with threat or use of force.) Toft, *Securing the Peace*, 29-30. Pamela Scholey and Khalil Shikaki in their essay “Considering the International DDR Experience and Spoiling” criticize Stedman, and implicitly Toft. They assert that motivations of spoilers are far more dynamic over time and relational to their interaction with conflict and peace processes, and that their motives for not compromising may be quite legitimate. These factors make socializing them more difficult if not impossible, leaving total capitulation or annihilation as the only solution for resolving conflict. Stephen Baranyi, ed., *The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding Post-9/11* (Vancouver: University of Washington Press, 2008), 284.

¹²² Kleisner, “Disengagement Operations,” 36.

These doctrinal and theoretical considerations for planning withdrawal, to include the concepts of termination criteria and end state, types of withdrawal, integration within the operational context, creating and exploiting lulls, and managing spoilers are certainly not all inclusive of the various factors and nuances of disengagement planning. However, they do contribute to the discourse on withdrawal and provide an initial framework for describing and analyzing disengagement planning and execution. Application in the case studies informs an evaluation of the manner of disengagement after a military intervention, and helps illustrate how the withdrawal supported or undermined the benefit/harm stability mechanisms.

Methodology

This study examines two cases using the mutual benefit/mutual harm model and the considerations for withdrawal previously identified. The analysis explores the hypothesis that the manner of withdrawal matters to the renewal of conflict with the additional intent of garnering insights useful to planners of military disengagement. After reviewing the historical context of the conflicts, the discussions focus on the application and balance of both benefit sharing and credible threat of harm as they manifested in the resolution of the conflict. Subsequently, a brief discussion and assessment of the conduct of the withdrawal illuminates how its execution supported or undermined the benefit/harm stability mechanisms put in place and whether the manner of the withdrawal mattered to the recurrence of conflict.

Case Selection

The cases analyzed in this study, Malaya and Vietnam, are relatively contemporary examples of foreign intervention in civil conflicts in which the intervener attempted, one successfully and the other not so, to establish an enduring peace.¹²³ Since this paper focuses on an

¹²³ Dr. Toft's quantitative analysis codes both of these civil conflicts as military victories (Vietnam a rebel victory and Malaya a government victory) that did not recur, were not identity based or fought over territory, and did not include post conflict security sector reform nor third party guarantees. While her

intervention strategy of benefit and harm and considerations of withdrawal, the study of the cases will not be inclusive of the full duration of the conflict. Discussion will be limited to the years of third party intervention, the British in Malaya from 1948 to 1960 and beyond and the U.S. in Vietnam from 1965 to 1973.

Given this limitation, both conflicts are similar in that they occurred about the same time with overlap in the 1960s, are instances of intervention or occupation by Anglo nations, involved building stability and security mechanisms to end civil conflict, and exhibited withdrawals that were deliberate and coherent with the overall operational construct and intent. The difference lies in their outcomes post third party intervention; Vietnam fell while Malaya resolved its conflict.

When plotted against the two variables considered in this monograph, the case studies of Malaya and Vietnam fall into the identified quadrants A and C respectively in the chart below along with additional example case(s). Whereas the optimal case selections to answer the inquiry of whether the manner of withdrawal matters would have come from quadrants A and B, an historical example combining a well executed, balanced intervention with a haphazard, disruptive withdrawal is not evident. Cases of failed interventions like Somalia and Angola fall into quadrant D, but are not useful to this study. While the cases may not be optimal, they exemplify ways that a withdrawal can reinforce, or create opportunities that support, an operational construct.

assessment of the absolute termination of the conflicts is accurate, the data does not capture the interim stages of the conflict in which third parties intervened or were present and withdrew. Toft, *Securing the Peace*, Appendix 1.

Benefit/Harm	Manner of Withdrawal	
	Deliberate and Coherent (withdrawal consistent with the strategic and operational context, guided by interest in stability)	Haphazard and Incoherent (hasty withdrawal dissociated from stability, guided by other pressures)
Balanced (appropriate balance of benefit/harm mechanisms to resolve/prevent conflict)	(A) Stable, enduring peace (withdrawal reinforces appropriate stability mechanisms) - <i>British in Malaya (1948-1960)</i> - <i>U.S. in Panama (1989-1990)</i> - <i>UNAMSIL, British, ECOWAS in Sierra Leone (1999-2005)</i> ¹²⁴	(B) Uncertain stability (withdrawal disruptive to stability mechanisms) - ??
Imbalanced (benefit/harm mechanisms inappropriate or insufficient to resolve/prevent conflict)	(C) Irreversible damage, conflict renewal (withdrawal supports flawed/inadequate stability mechanisms) - <i>U.S. in Vietnam (1965-1973)</i> - <i>Soviets in Afghanistan (1979-1989)</i>	(D) Unabated conflict (neither intervention nor withdrawal established or reinforced appropriate stability mechanisms) - <i>U.S. and UNOSOM II in Somalia (1993-1995)</i> ¹²⁵ - <i>UNAVEM I,II,III and MONUA in Angola (1988-1999)</i> ¹²⁶

Limitations

The analysis of Vietnam and Malaya provides a general overview that illustrates specific elements of third party intervention through the lens of the benefit/harm paradigm and the manner of withdrawal. This discussion of stability mechanisms will not provide a holistic understanding or a detailed analysis of the minutia of the conflicts. The discussion of disengagement is equally limited and tailored to attribute aspects of the conduct of the withdrawal that supported or undermined the durability of the peace. The conclusions and recommendations drawn are based on this somewhat superficial understanding and interpretation of historical information for the purpose of furthering the discourse on intervention and withdrawal planning.

¹²⁴ UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

¹²⁵ UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia

¹²⁶ UNAVEM: United Nations Angola Verification Missions; MONUA: United Nations Observer Mission in Angola

Case Studies

British in Malaya – Stable, enduring peace

The Malayan Emergency, as the British classified it to protect their economic interests, is viewed historically as a communist insurrection or civil war.¹²⁷ The Emergency lasted from 1948-1960 during which time the British intervened first as the colonial power and then as a third party in the conflict after Malayan independence in 1957. The intervention mobilized and reformed the security sector and improved governance to thwart the insurgency and generate enduring stability. As this is an example of non-recurrence of conflict, it is valuable to view the emergency through the lens of the benefit/harm model and explore how the military disengagement supported or undermined the stability mechanisms established.

Background

The British began colonizing Malaya by establishing a colony in Penang in 1791 and Singapore in 1819 and subsequently expanding to the main peninsula.¹²⁸ Britain recognized the strategic importance of the sea trade route through the Strait of Malacca and the area's rubber and tin resources promised revenue for the empire. As economic development progressed, the British encouraged Chinese and Indian migrants to settle and provide additional labor for the plantations

¹²⁷ Dr. Toft includes the Malayan Emergency in the data set she analyzed while studying peacebuilding. She records the war as starting in 1948 and concluding in 1960 when the government ended the state of emergency. Regarding the rest of her variables, she categorizes the conflict as not identity-based, not fought over territory, terminated with a military victory by government, no subsequent third party guarantees or security sector reform, and the conflict did not recur. Toft, *Securing the Peace*, Appendix A. A stable peace following a military victory supports Dr. Toft's theory. The government eliminated the opposing communist forces, which while continuing to menace Malaya, never rose again to the level threatening a civil war or the control of the state apparatus. Dr. Toft's assessment of the Malayan Emergency is generally accurate, however her data does not acknowledge the level of British involvement in resolving the crisis.

¹²⁸ Unless otherwise cited, background section is corroborated in multiple sources as listed in the bibliography. For a good overall history of the Malayan Emergency see: Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1975).

and mines. The mix of foreign cultures with the local Malaysians led to disputes, compelling the British to expand their control over Malaya to protect their interests.

British control over Malaya went unchallenged until World War II and their expulsion by the Japanese in January 1942. During occupation, the Japanese brutalized the people of Malaya and ravaged the resources and economy. The Chinese were the most harshly treated group, which induced them into arranging a resistance movement, the MPAJA (Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army), a primarily Chinese organization with communist leanings. The British covertly trained and armed these forces against their common enemy, the Japanese. When the Japanese abruptly departed in August 1945, the MPAJA attempted to take credit for the Japanese withdrawal and sought to establish a new communist nation under their leadership. They targeted the Malaysians to assert their control and punish them for working with the Japanese and subverting the Chinese during the occupation.¹²⁹

The British returned for a second period of colonization of Malaya in 1946 and were met with rising internal conflict that threatened Commonwealth economic benefits. Under colonial rule, the British pursued two policies: improve upon the negative perception of colonization by improving conditions and exploit the region's resources to stave off bankruptcy from World War II. They harshly dealt with protestors who threatened these objectives and sought to expand and consolidate their government control. The British plan of a Malayan Union in 1946, which subordinated the local sultans and expanded government intervention, was undermined by an unexpected and atypical political movement by the usually complacent Malaysians led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) which opposed its creation. The British responded in 1948 by creating the Federation of Malaya. It established a federation of states

¹²⁹ Robert Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars, 1948-1966* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 9.

under Malayan traditional leadership and protected the special citizenship rights of ethnic Malaysians. The British served as the protectorate of the federation.

Based on their valiant efforts and cooperation during World War II, the British initially recognized the Communist Party Malaya (CPM) with its armed wing, the MPAJA (or later known as the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) and Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA)) as a valid party and organization.¹³⁰ When their political efforts to gain legitimacy towards ousting the British and establishing a communist state failed, they initiated an armed struggle in 1948. They mobilized fighters from the defunct MPAJA, tapped into arms and ammunition cached during the war, and began a campaign of terror primarily focused on the resource extraction industries. The British Military Administration declared a state of emergency after they killed three planters in June 1948.

Under the emergency, the British and Malaya Federation immediately outlawed the CPM and other leftist parties and worked to provide ample protection to British owned tin mines and rubber estates, the principal targets of the insurgents. The slow British military response and inadequate domestic security gave the insurgents, or Communist Terrorists (CTs) as the British called them, the opportunity to grow and gain momentum in the rural areas, which ultimately extended the duration of the emergency. Slowly, British and Malayan political and military efforts improved security, targeted insurgents directly and indirectly, and nurtured progress toward self-government.

The British prevailing theory of the conflict was that eradication of the communist threat was principally a civil police action, a “matter of reinforcing the government with force.”¹³¹ Improving the domestic security apparatus and expanding civilian government control were

¹³⁰ Mohamed Ghazemy Mahmud, trans., *The Malaysian Army's Battle Against Communist Insurgency in Peninsular Malaysia 1968-1989* (Kuala Lumpur: Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, 2001), 3.

¹³¹ Introduction to Low Intensity Conflict, Historical Perspective - Malaya 1948. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_90-4_hisp.htm (accessed October 3, 2010).

primary and supported by direct military small unit action against guerillas. The maximum Commonwealth and British troop commitment of 40,000 in 1951 was surpassed by the fivefold growth in the domestic police to 70,000 and the expansion and training of the Malayan Home Guard, which exceeded 250,000 at its highest.¹³²

The British response was oriented towards a long-term political solution to the crisis and ultimately state independence. The strategy was to stabilize the state by winning the “hearts and minds” of the people under the Briggs Plan which will be further discussed, and eliminating the insurgents. Increasing insurgent activity and vigilance in executing this strategy caused a spike in violence in 1951 followed by steady reduction in guerilla fighters and a rising multi-ethnic nationalism that accelerated the smooth transition to independence in 1957. British forces continued to assist Malaya militarily well beyond its political independence.

Resolution of Conflict – The Benefit/Harm Model

The British strategy for resolving the conflict included extending the administrative control of the government and removing the communist threat. The Briggs Plan focused on denying support to the insurgents and improving political and economic conditions to generate support for the government. The security sector growth and development aimed to reestablish the monopoly of violence by the state. These were the benefit/harm mechanisms employed by the British to create a stable peace in Malaya.

The British began preparing Malaya for independence in the 1920's and 1930's when they initiated efforts to educate the future leaders of the state.¹³³ While the Japanese temporarily interrupted these efforts, the British objective remained the independence of the colony. The

¹³² David Derrick, “A rough guide to British Malaya,” Word Press, <http://davidderrick.wordpress.com/2007/09/13/a-rough-guide-to-british-malaya/> (accessed August 17, 2010).

¹³³ Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War, Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 139.

stability mechanisms were developed and managed with this political end state in mind. From initiation, the emergency was civilian led, increasingly by Malaysians themselves, with emphasis on the close coordination of civilian, military, and police activities at all levels of government.

The Briggs Plan included complementary benefit and harm measures.¹³⁴ The two goals of the plan were to extend administrative control over the population and to isolate the guerillas. In pursuit of these goals, the government shared benefits in several ways. They improved governance at all levels and integrated the diverse population into the administration, economy, and security sector to build stakeholders, encourage ethnic tolerance, and move toward self-governance. They grew and trained a coordinated and mutually supportive domestic military, police force, and system of Home Guards to build the confidence of the people in the government's ability to protect them and their livelihoods down to the local level. They resettled in "New Villages" those mostly Chinese rural and jungle fringe populations that lay beyond government reach in order to mitigate insurgent influence over them. The government wanted to prevent them from assisting the insurgents, and integrate them into and empower them within the political, security, and economic system. The government loosened emergency restrictions in subdued areas to encourage further cooperation.

The government effectively employed these efforts to extend benefits to the population while simultaneously harming the communist threat. These efforts served to ideologically undermine communism and the underlying nationalist cause of the movement, isolate the insurgents from the population preventing recruiting or coercion, and deny food, resources, and information to the guerilla fighters to weaken their resistance. The government used their control to institute intelligence reform, intensify collection efforts, and maximize incentives to further identify and eliminate insurgents and their civilian sympathizers, the Min Yuen. Control also

¹³⁴ The Briggs Plan is discussed in many sources to include: Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War*, 55-60; and Anthony Short, *The Communist insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1975), 231-253.

enabled enforcement of collective punishment, such as curfews, in population areas that aided the insurgents or refused to cooperate.

The direct tactical military and para-military action to eliminate the insurgents worked in concert with the indirect benefit/harm efforts of the Briggs Plan. The military plan included two primary efforts. First, forces were deployed throughout the federation to work habitually with police at the state/settlement, district and police district levels to reinforce the government and rule of law.¹³⁵ Second, larger forces operated in the jungles to interdict insurgent supply lines and force their continuous movement and dispersion. The approach consisted of area domination operations, concentrating the majority of direct military actions within one state until it was cleared of communist insurgents, or “white”, before progressing to the next state.¹³⁶ They sequenced operations from the least to the most “black” areas which led to progressive clearing from the central states outwards. As military forces cleared areas, police and Home Guard assumed responsibility for security and the government loosened the emergency restrictions.¹³⁷

Upon engaging with the enemy in area domination operations, the British soon realized that the conventional tactics employed during World War II were unsuitable in an unconventional, low-intensity, guerilla-style type of warfare. In response, they established the Jungle Warfare School in Jahore, Malaya in 1950. They trained Commonwealth, and eventually domestic security forces in the drills and tactics suitable to jungle warfare and continuously updated their doctrine and training based on the experiences of units in the field.¹³⁸ As a result, they became more effective at anti-terrorist operations. The importance of small unit tactics and

¹³⁵ Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency*, 22; Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya*, 353.

¹³⁶ Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency*, 22.

¹³⁷ Scott, McMichael, *Historical Perspective on Light Infantry* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1987): 100-102. <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#hist> (accessed October 4, 2010).

¹³⁸ For an account of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from the jungle warfare school see: McMichael, *Historical Perspective on Light Infantry*, 104-120.

multi-role capability of the helicopter contributed to the development of jungle counterinsurgency doctrine that continues to be relevant and useful.

Commonwealth military forces provided the bulk of the initial military response to the emergency in 1948, peaking at 30,000 in 1951. Gradually, Malayan forces were centralized, reorganized, enlarged and trained to contend with the domestic security issues. By the end of 1953, “the majority of the infantry battalions engaged in anti-terrorist operations were Malayan.”¹³⁹ The domestic police and Home Guard expanded, reorganized, trained in order to take on full responsibility for local security, resettlement, and law enforcement duties.

Through the course of the conflict, the combined and balanced military, civil and police benefit and harm efforts under of the Malaysians and the Commonwealth reduced roughly 8,000 terrorists to less than 400 and established the conditions for an enduring peace.¹⁴⁰ The interdependence of the Briggs Plan and security force development accomplished the sharing of political and economic benefits while punishing defectors and spoilers of the peace. The British achieved their goal of Malayan independence and self-governance, but the nations remained closely tied militarily, politically, and economically.

Militarily, Commonwealth forces continued to augment the Malayan forces beyond independence on Merdeka day, 31 August 1957, through the formal declaration of the end of the Emergency in July 1960, with some units continuing anti-terrorism operations as late as 1963. Defense agreements with Britain in 1957 and 1963 and the Five-Power defense agreement (between Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand) in 1968 guaranteed the security of the new country against external threats and kept Commonwealth forces in Malaysia

¹³⁹ Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency*, 49.

¹⁴⁰ The numbers of communist insurgents differs by source. These figures are a rough average derived from sources in the bibliography.

until 1971 when the British withdrew by choice.¹⁴¹ Within the political sector, the Malaysians self-organized into political parties and formed a multi-ethnic political alliance that unified the colony and enabled the British to grant independence and gradually transition the complete responsibility for self-government. British citizens continued to work side by side with Malaysians as civil government employees of the state for many years. British foreign investment and economic cooperation continued under the Commonwealth of Nations.¹⁴²

Conduct of the Withdrawal

The British objective of preparing Malaya for independence indicated their intent to disengage even before the Emergency and acknowledged the international pressure to decolonize. The conduct of their involvement in Malaya from 1920 until 1957 demonstrated their national will to accomplish this single aim without jeopardizing British economic and security interests in the region. Enduring stability was a critical component to this and the British viewed a delayed, slow transition and partial withdrawal as the least disruptive way to depart. Whereas the Emergency initially disturbed the peace, it also sped up the process of consolidating the government and institutionalizing the monopoly on violence required for independence because it mobilized and unified the population and marshaled additional Commonwealth resources.

The disengagement of military forces from Malaya is difficult to separate from the conduct of the Emergency. Under the area domination approach, Commonwealth forces disengaged from certified “white” areas, leaving security responsibility to the police and Home Guard. They subsequently focused on the next “black” area, prioritized based on considerations

¹⁴¹ William Jackson, *Withdrawal from Empire: A Military View* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987), Part II. William Jackson discusses the British military disengagement from Southeast Asia in detail.

¹⁴² Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War*, 146-148.

of insurgent presence, key terrain, and geographic location. Military forces assigned to support the local police remained to sustain the progress.¹⁴³

As the disengagement was contingent on generating “white” conditions, the military forces served to support the extension of civil authority and rule of law. They conducted operations to target and eliminate, coerce, or co-opt spoilers of the peace, both the terrorists and their sympathizers. They used surprise and mobility and leveraged information to control the location, timing and tempo of the violence to force the terrorists to fight on their terms and to create space for the other elements of the Briggs Plan. As “white” areas expanded and as the domestic security sector developed, the requirement for Commonwealth military troops declined and units were not replaced. Domestic forces augmented and reinforced local police and civil authorities.

The British maintained a legitimate and welcomed residual military presence after Malayan independence and the conclusion of the Emergency. Defense agreements with Malaya in 1957 and Malaysia in 1963 and 1968 authorized residual Commonwealth forces and operating bases to remain in the country. Under the agreements, the Commonwealth continued assisting anti-terrorism efforts and sustained a protectorate type responsibility for external defense. This arrangement prevented overloading the Malayan security sector, which continued to combat the insurgency, and was exercised when Indonesia challenged the newly formed Malaysia in 1963.

Did the Conduct of British Withdrawal Matter?

The conduct of the British withdrawal was indistinguishable from the operational approach and was consistent with the overall intent to prepare Malaya for independence and self-governance, and protect British interests. The Briggs Plan and direct military engagement successfully extended the control of the government and virtually eliminated the communist

¹⁴³ McMichael, *Historical Perspective on Light Infantry*, 100-102.

threat. The benefit/harm stability mechanisms addressed the principal underlying causes of conflict stemming from ethnic tensions (economic disparity, social prejudice, and political inequality) and nationalism and generated a credible threat of harm to defectors to the peace. While the concerted Commonwealth effort to completely eliminate the communist ideology and insurgents failed, the stability systems did undermine their grievances and reduced them to a level manageable by domestic and residual security forces.

Based on the operational military and civil success in Malaya, one could argue that the disengagement did not matter to the end result – a stable enduring peace. By 1957 the bulk of the Communist threat had been eliminated, the government had consolidated power, economic and political disparity was being addressed, and the Malayan security forces were reformed and dramatically improved. This is consistent with Dr. Toft's assertion that sharing benefits and generating a credible harm through domestic SSR in the appropriate contextual balance will contribute to enduring peace.

However, the manner of withdrawal did matter in that its conduct was virtually inherent within the context of the emergency response and movement towards sovereignty. The delayed and partial withdrawal facilitated ongoing security operations, reduced concern over external security threats, protected domestic and international economic interests, demonstrated the British commitment to responsible decolonization and democratization, and enabled a smooth transition to independence and self-governance. A hasty withdrawal conducted independently of conditions on the ground and before the maturation of the stability mechanisms could have resulted in a resurgence of the communist threat or failure to repel aggression by an opportunistic neighbor.

The deliberate conditions-based disengagement reinforced the benefit/harm mechanisms that prevented conflict renewal. When looked at holistically, the disengagement was completely intertwined and logically nested with the conduct of the conflict itself and the broader long-term British strategic intent. An extended military presence and defense obligation in Malaya did come at high financial cost to Britain, but the return of maintaining influence, protecting resources and

sea lines of communication, extending operational reach, and building an enduring peace at a major geographic choke point with strategic implications offset the investment and opportunity costs.

U.S. in Vietnam – Irreversible damage, conflict renewal

The Vietnam Conflict, as referred to in the United States, is often viewed holistically as a civil war.¹⁴⁴ The U.S. intervention in the conflict from 1965-1973 attempted to strengthen the security forces and government of South Vietnam and reestablish peace under terms favorable to the United States. As an example of a conflict that recurred post third party intervention, it is worth discussing how the U.S. attempted to resolve the conflict using the lens of the benefit/harm model, and how the conduct of the withdrawal of military forces supported or undermined these efforts.

This case differs from the British in Malaya in several important ways. The North Vietnamese controlled and governed significant territory they considered a sovereign entity and viewed themselves as the legitimate government of greater Vietnam. As such, they built a significant conventional military capability, which was not evident in Malaya, while also sponsoring insurgent activity. Additionally they received considerable external aid and support from their communist sponsors, unlike the insurgents in Malaya, which enabled them to continue the conflict. These differences serve to highlight the importance of context when determining the appropriate balance of benefit/harm stability mechanisms, and also the limitations of the theory.

¹⁴⁴ Dr. Toft includes Vietnam as one of her cases in the analysis on the durability of post-conflict peace. She codes the war as starting in 1957 and lasting until 1975. Using her variables, the war was not identity-based nor fought over territory; the war ended with a military victory by rebels, and the conflict did not recur. Neither security sector reform nor third party guarantees contributed to the stability of the peace after 1975. Toft, *Securing the Peace*, Appendix A. Stability after a military victory reinforces Dr. Toft's analysis, as one side decisively dominated the other and therefore can dictate without competition the terms of the post-conflict environment. Her post conflict assessment is accurate given the North Vietnamese victory over the south, but it does not capture the intervention of the U.S. nor the peace efforts attempted during and towards the end of that intervention from 1965 until 1973.

Background

After World War II and the defeat of the Japanese Empire, the French continued their pre-war attempts to exert their influence and governance over their colonies in Indochina.¹⁴⁵ Their attempts met with marked resistance and contributed to the growth of budding nationalism in Vietnam. The nationalist Communist movement in northern Vietnam, the Viet Minh, under the influence of the Soviet Union and China, mounted an insurgency against the French in the late 1940s.

In the context of the nascent Cold War between the East and West, the U.S. feared a domino effect of countries falling to communism and started committing aid and advisors to the French and Vietnamese anti-communism effort in Indochina starting in 1950. Supplied by their Communist allies, the Viet Minh gradually developed and employed a conventional military to employ against the French occupiers. After being militarily defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French negotiated the terms for their departure, an agreement that also split the country along the 17th parallel and recognized the sovereignty of the state as a whole.

With the French departing, the U.S. continued to escalate its support from military assistance and advisors to the introduction of combat troops in March 1965. The purpose of the intervention was to assist the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in protecting the South Vietnamese government against a growing internal communist insurgency (the Viet Cong) and a conventional threat from the north. U.S. combat troop commitments rapidly escalated, reaching a high of over 500,000 by 1969.

During this time the U.S. pursued a military centric search and destroy attrition strategy, using conventional capabilities and firepower aimed at killing more communist fighters than they

¹⁴⁵ Unless otherwise cited, the background section is corroborated in multiple sources as listed in the bibliography. For a good overall history of the Vietnam Conflict see: James H. Willbanks, *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (Modern War Studies)* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).

could produce while minimizing U.S. casualties.¹⁴⁶ American combat troops engaged in direct action, and equipped and assisted the RVNAF to do the same under the CRIMP (Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan). Civil and military population pacification programs existed and were integrated in 1967 under CORDS (Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support), but the efforts and promise of a counterinsurgency approach of winning hearts and minds remained secondary to conventional offensive, enemy oriented operations consistent with the prevailing institutional theory of how to win the war.¹⁴⁷

The North Vietnamese launching of the Tet offensive in February 1968 generated a popular perception that the strategy of attrition was not working and forced a strategic reevaluation of the commitment to and execution of the U.S. intervention.¹⁴⁸ In 1969 emphasis shifted to enabling the RVNAF and the South Vietnamese government to assume responsibility for the security of South Vietnam – a policy coined “Vietnamization” by then Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and adopted by President Nixon.¹⁴⁹ This marked the beginning of a

¹⁴⁶ Andrew Krepinevich states that this was the Army’s perception of how wars ought to be waged, which he coins the “Army Concept” or the “Concept,” based on and reinforced by recent U.S. successful warfighting experiences in the World Wars and Korea. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 4. H.R. McMaster argues that “Westmoreland’s “strategy” of attrition in South Vietnam, was, in essence, the absence of a strategy.” In other words, the strategy defaulted to conventional military action (bombing and killing) because of unclear policy goals and military objectives. H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty : Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 333.

¹⁴⁷ This is the prevailing argument in John Nagl’s book *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* in which he argues that the U.S. Army failed to learn during their experience in Vietnam and inappropriately continued to employ a conventional strategy. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2005).

¹⁴⁸ Krepinevich argues that while the Tet offensive shook the American people’s and the Johnson administration’s faith in the Army’s strategy, it was “insufficient to overcome the Concept’s hold over its approach to war. The military’s response to the implications of the Tet Offensive was the same as it had been throughout the war: apply the Concept, but at a higher level of intensity.” Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, 237.

¹⁴⁹ Melvin Laird served as the Secretary of Defense under President Nixon from January 1969 until January 1973. During his tenure he orchestrated the de-Americanization/Vietnamization of the Vietnam Conflict and the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam.

concerted effort to stabilize the conditions in South Vietnam and the initiation of U.S. troop withdrawal.

Resolution of Conflict – The Benefit/Harm Model

The Vietnamization of the conflict led the U.S. to pursue a variety of activities that would facilitate the self-sufficiency of South Vietnam to provide for its own governance and security.¹⁵⁰

The Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan or CRIMP improved the conventional and internal security capabilities of their military forces. Ongoing U.S. and South Vietnamese combined military offensives continued to degrade enemy strength and harm sympathizers. Pacification programs generated domestic support for the military and government and improved economic conditions. These were the main harm/benefit efforts pursued to create stability in South Vietnam.

The American strategy to build an enduring peace rested primarily on generating credible harm to defectors of the peace, in this case the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, who threatened to overwhelm the South Vietnamese state. By 1971 the enormous influx of capital and equipment under the CRIMP had resulted in a one million man South Vietnamese Army capable of “defeating an internal insurgency but requiring American aid to counter a North Vietnamese invasion.”¹⁵¹ Projects ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS undertaken in 1972 accelerated the delivery of equipment in anticipation of a ceasefire agreement which could curtail deliveries of materiel.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Dave Palmer dedicates an entire chapter to Vietnamization. Dave R. Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1995).

¹⁵¹ Graham A. Cosmas, *MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968-1973* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2007), 277.

¹⁵² William E. Le Gro, *Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 16.

American and South Vietnamese combat troops continued offensive operations after 1969, but shifted search and destroy missions away from attacking the enemy to keeping them away from populated areas and targeting their infiltration and supply corridors.¹⁵³ In conjunction with the withdrawal, the U.S. gradually transitioned these operations to the RVNAF, but they still depended on the U.S. for air support and heavy sophisticated weaponry.¹⁵⁴ In parallel with this process, U.S. tactical advisor teams changed to combat assistance teams before withdrawing completely from RVNAF units.¹⁵⁵

The other half of the stability paradigm of sharing benefits was pursued with the pacification programs under the coordination of CORDS. The programs were similar to those under the Briggs Plan in Malaya. “Development cadres moved into contested villages and hamlets, expelled or suppressed the Viet Cong guerrillas and political infrastructure, and set up elected local governments and People’s Self-Defense Force units. Behind this shield of security were to come land reform and other economic improvements aimed at giving the people a stake in Saigon’s system.”¹⁵⁶ These peacebuilding measures were intended to enhance governance, expand the domestic security forces, and improve population involvement and stake in the administration, economy, and security of their local areas. While making some progress in these areas, execution and resourcing of the pacification efforts remained secondary to the waging of conventional operations and were at times counterproductive to long term peace and stability.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Graham A. Cosmas, *MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968-1973* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2007), 255. U.S. supported ARVN limited offenses or spoiling attacks in Cambodia (May/June 1970) and Laos (February/March 1971) set the conditions for American withdrawal by putting North Vietnam on the defensive. Also Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet*, 243.

¹⁵⁴ American air and naval support, as well as materiel replacement played critical roles in facilitating the ARVN halt to a North Vietnamese invasion, the Easter Offensive, in March 1972. Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet*, 244-255.

¹⁵⁵ Cosmas, *MACV The Joint Command*, 273.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 264.

¹⁵⁷ Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, 233. In Chapter 8 “The Other War”, Krepinevich describes how the pacification efforts and tactics worked both for and against stability in Vietnam.

By the end of 1971, U.S. military leadership was convinced that the pacification program was working due to increased local security and improved freedom of movement.¹⁵⁸ However, they failed to appreciate why they achieved progress. They overly attributed the success and gains to military operations while underemphasizing the weakened enemy resistance (due to the Viet Cong's self-inflicted decimation and dramatic reduction to the North Vietnamese Army during the Tet Offensive), the civilian pacification efforts under CORDs, and the augmentation of domestic security forces.¹⁵⁹ Favorable conditions and benefit sharing were possible under low threat from insurgents and the North Vietnamese military, but their resilience under threat was questionable. Additionally, while pacification worked to an extent in isolating the insurgents from the population and potential recruits, it could not deny the insurgents food, resources, and information that infiltrated from external sources in the North.

These mechanisms of benefit and harm, manifested as pacification, allied offensives and domestic capability and capacity building, were highly interdependent as each contributed to the success of the other. Although both benefit and harm were present, the strategy emphasized direct military action over positive peace building and pacification measures. Pacification took greater focus after 1968 with the creation of CORDS, but generally remained a secondary U.S. effort. The imbalance of harm to benefit is captured by the disproportionate amount of effort U.S. combat units expended on pacification and security activities (roughly 30%) compared to that directed to combat operations.¹⁶⁰

Sir Robert Thompson in his book *No Exit From Vietnam* reinforces this lack of balance in his critique on the American experience in Vietnam: “the American soldier scored many encouraging successes in battle, but winning battles does not necessarily mean winning wars

¹⁵⁸ Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet*, 224.

¹⁵⁹ Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, 257.

¹⁶⁰ Cosmas, *MACV The Joint Command*, 256.

when those battles are merely prolonging and magnifying the strategic error.”¹⁶¹ When the strategic error of attrition finally began to gain recognition in 1968 and the strategy turned slightly toward pacification under General Creighton Abrams in his “one war” approach, the domestic political climate made further commitment to the conflict untenable.¹⁶² The intentions of the plan to increase effective civil authority and population security still frequently fell victim to the Army’s institutional strategy of attrition and emphasis on kill ratios.¹⁶³ American sentiment to end U.S. intervention was reflected in the 1968 presidential election when Richard Nixon was elected on his promise of resolving Vietnam via “peace with honor.”

In support of his promise, President Nixon initiated U.S. military disengagement and pursued a path of diplomatic resolution. The initial U.S. withdrawal plans called for incremental reduction in American forces over several years with commensurate improvement in the ability of the South Vietnam to secure and govern themselves.¹⁶⁴ Vietnamization intended to ensure the maintenance of a credible threat of harm with a sharing of benefits and laid the foundation for ending U.S. military intervention, building a self-sufficient South Vietnamese state, and reaching an honorable peace agreement. From July 1969 to November 1972 U.S. forces reduced from 549,500 to 27,000 troops.¹⁶⁵

The Paris Peace Accords signed 27 January 1973 intended to establish peace in Vietnam. The provisions of the treaty initiated a ceasefire in place, withdrawal of remaining U.S. troops

¹⁶¹ Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency : The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 136.

¹⁶² Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 170-171.

¹⁶³ Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, 254-256.

¹⁶⁴ Melvin R. Laird, "Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2005). <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61195/melvin-r-laird/iraq-learning-the-lessons-of-vietnam> (accessed November 4, 2010).

¹⁶⁵ Cosmas, *MACV The Joint Command*, 178.

within 60 days, and negotiations toward political settlement between North and South Vietnam.¹⁶⁶ A residual international force, the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) was created to supervise the ceasefire, withdrawal of forces, and implementation or violation of the peace agreement.¹⁶⁷ A small U.S. military presence was to remain to continue providing technical assistance but not operational advice to the RVNAF.

Conduct of the Withdrawal

President Nixon was true to his campaign promise to disengage from Vietnam and started military planners working a deliberate, phased withdrawal strategy. They developed several options for the incremental withdrawal of troops over different durations of time.¹⁶⁸ Based on risk to the mission and the force, and an interest in maintaining flexibility, military leaders advocated a “cut and try” conditions-based methodology dependent on continuous evaluation on the status of the improvement rate of RVNAF, the pacification progress, and the enemy threat before announcing and implementing the next reduction in forces. A residual force was projected to remain to provide combat, logistical and advisory support and emergency reinforcement to the South Vietnamese and protect U.S. bases.¹⁶⁹ The conditions based withdrawal and a vision of the remaining forces nested the disengagement within the overall operational construct of Vietnamization.

¹⁶⁶ Steven Cohen, *Vietnam: Anthology and Guide to a Television History* (New York: Knopf, 1983), 334-338. A copy of the agreement and protocols along with a multitude of other documents related to Vietnam are available in this compilation.

¹⁶⁷ Le Gro, *Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation*, 3.

¹⁶⁸ Cosmas, *MACV The Joint Command*, 171. Cosmas is cited extensively in this section because his historical account from the perspective of the Joint Command offers detailed insights into the actual operational planning for the military withdrawal from Vietnam that are not available in other sources.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 146, 149.

A lull in violence after the failed Tet Offensive in 1968 offered the opportunity to test Vietnamization.¹⁷⁰ While the North Vietnamese recovered, rebuilt their conventional military forces and tried to regenerate the insurgency, the U.S. took advantage of the permissiveness of the environment to focus on pacification and improve the RVNAF. These efforts extended South Vietnamese government control and development programs and thwarted the North Vietnamese attempt to infiltrate or reignite the popular Communist movement in the south.¹⁷¹ The success served only to reinforce to political leadership that further withdrawals were possible, even though military leaders felt it jeopardized mission success.¹⁷²

Starting with the initial redeployments in 1969, the withdrawal took on a momentum of its own and domestic political pressures dictated the pace of withdrawal rather than evaluation of conditions in Vietnam.¹⁷³ While the military planners were obligated to support a politically motivated time and numbers driven disengagement, the Administration deferred to the military as to the composition of redeployment increments and scheduling of unit departures.¹⁷⁴

Planners maximized this flexibility in how they orchestrated the withdrawal. They prioritized missions, identified critical locations, and stepped down unit and capabilities with these in mind. They “weighted the initial increments toward combat forces so as to retain combat

¹⁷⁰ Former Secretary of Defense Laird cites that the North Vietnamese Army lost approximately 289,000 men in 1968 alone, which contributed to the reduction of violence. Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam.”

¹⁷¹ Dave Palmer argues that U.S. pacification programs were expanded and working after the Tet offensive. He cites North Vietnamese documents that demonstrate frustration with their decreasing ability to operate in South Vietnam. Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet*, 226.

¹⁷² George Herring cites that General Abrams “bitterly protested the new troop withdrawals, warning that they would leave South Vietnam vulnerable to enemy military pressure and could be devastating to the Vietnamization program.” George Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill Humanities Social Sciences Languages, 2002), 288.

¹⁷³ As anticipated by President Nixon’s National Security Secretary, Henry Kissinger, “Withdrawal of U.S. troops will become like salted peanuts to the American public: The more U.S. troops come home, the more will be demanded.” Henry A. Kissinger, *Memorandum for the President, Subject: Our Present Course On Vietnam* (Washington D.C.: The White House, September 10, 1969): 2. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20061001/peanuts.pdf> (accessed November 7, 2010).

¹⁷⁴ Cosmas, *MACV The Joint Command*, 172.

support and combat service support units needed to sustain the South Vietnamese until completion of their modernization program.”¹⁷⁵ They reduced combat forces first in low threat areas with strong RVNAF units, and areas where allies were making progress in pacification and military operations.¹⁷⁶ They delayed reduction in CORDS personnel and advisors to sustain the momentum of pacification and military development.¹⁷⁷

Within the dictated time increments they moderated the tempo of the reduction by distributing different sized increments of the whole redeployment package at varying intervals, even heavily weighting the timing of drawdowns until late in the period to account for conditions on the ground. The severity of the threat along with logistics, budgetary, and political requirements and concerns all informed the arranging and sequencing of departures within increments. For example, the planners scheduled maneuver battalions’ departures late within each interval in order to back up South Vietnamese forces assuming battlefield responsibilities if necessary and they delayed redeployments in 1971 to support the South Vietnamese elections.¹⁷⁸

Did the Conduct of U.S. Withdrawal Matter?

Given the political constraints dictating the pace of the withdrawal, military planners and leaders optimized the flexibility they had so that the disengagement of military forces nested within the overall campaign of Vietnamization and minimized disruption of the stability systems in place. CRIMP and CORDS both successfully addressed some of the underlying causes of conflict by restoring internal order, bettering economic conditions, improving popular satisfaction with the government, and strengthening state institutions. However, the U.S. pacification efforts could not affect the North’s ideological and political motivations or their desire for national unity.

¹⁷⁵ Cosmas, *MACV The Joint Command*, 173.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 173-175.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 266, 273.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 162, 167, 173.

This highlights the limitation of the benefit/harm model – it only works in accessible areas. The operational approach pursued in South Vietnam could not eliminate the external threat or resources that provided the opportunity for conflict renewal. The conduct of the withdrawal could not overcome these challenges or redeem the military strategy of attrition and emphasis on harm pursued for the better course of the conflict.

An argument could be made that the conduct of the withdrawal did not matter to the end result – a recurrence of violence and ultimate defeat of the South Vietnamese after the negotiated settlement and U.S. disengagement. However, the prolonged deliberate withdrawal demonstrated the U.S. interest in responsibly transitioning the conflict back to the South Vietnamese, generated some space for the stability mechanisms to take root, and allowed the South Vietnamese government and military to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency.¹⁷⁹ A rapid or more poorly orchestrated disengagement would likely have hastened the defeat. One could assert that this would perhaps have been more desirable given the cost in lives and treasure to both the U.S. and Vietnam, but that perspective is valid only through the hindsight of knowing the result.

Unfortunately, the long withdrawal also set the conditions for conflict recurrence. It weakened the U.S. position diplomatically by incrementally reducing leverage over time and signaling a lack of domestic fortitude and inevitable exit. This debilitated their ability to negotiate favorably, emboldened the North Vietnamese to seek greater concessions, and manifested negatively in the Paris Peace Accords of January 1973. The principal flaw was the concession to allow a ceasefire in place without a provision mandating the withdrawal of North Vietnamese military forces in South Vietnam.¹⁸⁰ The agreement sanctioned the tolerance of dual sovereignty (continued existence of opposing groups contending for control over the government) in South

¹⁷⁹ Former Secretary of Defense Laird asserts upon reflection “I believed then and still believe today that given enough outside resources, South Vietnam was capable of defending itself...” Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam.”

¹⁸⁰ George Herring cites the presence of 150,000 North Vietnamese troops below the demilitarized zone at the time of the peace agreement. Herring, *America's Longest War*, 319.

Vietnam.¹⁸¹ Exacerbating this was the inept enforcement of the ceasefire by the ICCS (the third party guarantee), which enabled the North Vietnamese to resupply and reinforce their military forces in the south.¹⁸² The U.S. failure in Vietnam is consistent with Dr. Toft's findings that conflict termination by negotiated settlement and third party guarantee are correlated with a higher recurrence of conflict.

Another contributing factor to renewal of conflict was U.S. failure to budget continued military and government financial assistance to South Vietnam post-settlement. This undermined the progress made in the security sector during the intervention and impaired their ability to contend militarily with the growing threat within and beyond its borders.¹⁸³ Lack of funding diminished the effectiveness of security forces, reducing the threat of credible harm below the deterrent and self-defense threshold leading to renewal of violence.¹⁸⁴

Did the actual conduct of the withdrawal matter to the renewal of conflict? It mattered because it reinforced the conditions for stability and provided the time and space to allow for two key opportunities. First, it allowed U.S. forces to disengage from a perceived quagmire under a negotiated settlement and not under fire. Second, it gave the South Vietnamese the governing and military tools to determine their future sovereignty. The imbalance of benefit/harm in the operational construct and later U.S. political and diplomatic failings that emboldened the North set the conditions for conflict renewal are not a reflection on the failure or unimportance of the military disengagement process.

¹⁸¹ Mason, *Sustaining the Peace*, 42.

¹⁸² Le Gro, *Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation*, 3.

¹⁸³ COL William E. Le Gro describes in detail how the budget restrictions imposed by Congress in Fiscal Years 1974 and 1975 devastated South Vietnamese operational capability. Le Gro, *Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation*, 80-87.

¹⁸⁴ Former Secretary of Defense Laird asserts that “we grabbed defeat from the jaws of victory two years later [after the U.S. withdrawal in 1973] when Congress cut off the funding for South Vietnam that had allowed it to continue to fight on its own.” Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam.”

Recommendations and Conclusion

The case studies summarized above outlined the basic background of the conflict, described the benefit/harm stability mechanisms employed by the intervening state, and addressed how the withdrawal supported or undermined the system of stability. These studies indicate that both the stability mechanisms put in place during an intervention and the manner of withdrawal matter to the recurrence of conflict. The analysis also demonstrates the utility of the benefit/harm model and theoretical concepts on disengagement initially discussed. Finally the analysis points to the existence of some other generalizable considerations for planning disengagement. Specific examples are drawn from the case studies for the purpose of clarifying these ideas. The final thoughts of this study attempt to capture and summarize these insights as recommendations for planners preparing for or executing a military withdrawal, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Recommendations

Utility of Withdrawal Theory

Dr. Edelstein's framework of decisions for withdrawal and the typology of disengagement are useful for military consideration. Planners need to be aware of these different types of withdrawal in order to make feasible, acceptable and suitable recommendations to our military and civilian leaders on which type to pursue, as the leadership will ultimately dictate the general terms of disengagement. Also, understanding the type of withdrawal framework is necessary for planners to array units and sequence events and activities to progress toward and complete the disengagement. The two case studies presented in this paper demonstrated two different types of withdrawal – a phased withdrawal from Vietnam and a delayed and partial withdrawal from Malaya – that each required significantly different disengagement plans.

MAJ Kleisner's three important considerations for withdrawal (viewing disengagement within the broader operational context, creating and exploiting lulls in violence, and managing

spoilers) are also useful. Both case studies exemplified withdrawals planned in conjunction with ongoing operations. However, even though the drawdown in Vietnam was logically nested, it did become somewhat disconnected from the environmental context as it was increasingly politically driven for short term benefits instead of operationally motivated for long term stability.

The U.S. and Britain in their respective interventions created and exploited lulls in violence to expand governmental control and pacification, but did so in distinctly different ways. In Vietnam, lulls after major operations like the Tet Offensive were exploited to improve local security and governance for the purpose of bolstering the legitimacy of the state and facilitating future operations. U.S. forces also used spoiling attacks in Cambodia and Laos to create space for disengagement. In Malaya, the lulls created after major operations that turned areas “white” were opportunities for established civil authorities to take over and the preponderance of military forces to disengage. These are examples of managing the time, place, target, intensity and duration of violence (or lack thereof) to set the conditions to withdraw.

Finally, both the U.S. and British managed spoilers of the peace, the insurgent variety, by eliminating them through harm mechanisms (using direct action and denial operations) or by co-opting them through benefit sharing (making them stakeholders) as illustrated in the case studies. Vietnam exemplified the difficulty of managing spoilers of the more conventional military/state type when their resources, safe haven, and support network lie outside the principle operating areas and they are sponsored by other states. The North Vietnamese could not be bribed, socialized, or coerced into ending the conflict and their presence in South Vietnam was legitimized under the peace agreement.

Beyond the theoretical considerations offered by Dr. Edelstein and MAJ Kleisner, the case studies offer some additional considerations for planning military withdrawal. While the disengagements in the cases were vastly different, a commonality between them was that the complete and simultaneous disengagement and departure of military forces from those interventions was neither practical nor desirable nor possible. As such, planners were required to

sequence and manage the disengagement and its inherent risks deliberately and coherently. They did this by considering the metrics for disengagement and the orchestration of the withdrawal. They focused on minimizing the disruption of stability by avoiding: agitating the original causes of conflict, creating new causes of conflict, or generating conditions for renewal of violence.

Employment of Metrics

After a decision is made to disengage the military, the withdrawal will proceed incrementally in stages. Planners should consider utilizing metrics to manage the deliberate decline in forces. Metrics describing the circumstances necessary to proceed with the next increment of disengagement could include conditions, time, or resource elements. They could be measures of the benefit/harm mechanisms implemented to stabilize the system (i.e. functioning government, security sector reform, elimination of the enemy threat) - a conditions on the ground based approach. The metrics could be politically motivated or dictated, internationally mandated, or negotiation based - frequently a more time oriented approach. They could also be driven by cost or resource constraints, domestic requirements, unit rotation cycles, logistical limitations, or other operational and strategic requirements - a finite resource based approach. Whereas in the Malaya case study conditions on the ground dictated the disengagement, the Vietnam case study demonstrated the requirement for the planners to incorporate and integrate conditions-, time-, and resource-based considerations.

Metrics to manage an incremental disengagement have marginal utility unless they are honored and are sufficiently flexible to adapt to operational and strategic changes. Planners should deliberate on what happens when gates cannot be or are not met. Proceeding with the withdrawal regardless of meeting the conditions could jeopardize both stability and the credibility of the intervener. Failing to meet time requirements could damage legitimacy of the intervention in the eyes of domestic and international audiences. Ignoring resource constraints could put the operation or other national contingencies or interests at risk. In the Vietnam case study, political

pressures for U.S. withdrawal drove a timeline that while feasible, disengaged more troops than what military leaders estimated they needed to accomplish the mission. The British in Malaya took a far more flexible approach to time and resources that ensured conditions for enduring stability.

Branch plans should account for situations that may require an operational pause from disengagement, a suspension of the disengagement, or at worst case the necessity to reengage. Planners should also project scenarios in which the gates could be compressed and the timeline accelerated, as occurred in the Vietnam case study, and scenarios in which a long-term habitual presence is desired or required, as in Malaya.

Facets of Orchestrating Withdrawal

Beyond the use of metrics to manage the withdrawal, the orchestration of withdrawal is also a critical consideration. Derived from the case study analysis, force sizing, capability decline, task reduction and balance, and geographical consolidation are all facets of withdrawal planning that can affect the success of the disengagement.

An incremental disengagement as introduced above means that some forces will leave earlier while others remain longer – be it days, months or years. Planners should consider the right size of the force remaining at each conditions-, time- and/or resource-based increment of the withdrawal, including what may be required as a residual force presence. The size at the conclusion of each stage could be mandated by policy or a negotiated agreement, as in Vietnam, or be situation dependent, as in Malaya. Planners should consider not only the tempo of the force reduction between increments, but also within each increment, managing the withdrawal by front loading, end loading or evenly distributing the timing of unit disengagements to maximize gains and minimize disruption. While planners in Vietnam could not dictate force reduction sizes between increments, they did delay reductions until late within increments to maximize support to

the ARVN. The British planners in Malaya decreased force size towards the latter end of the conflict by not replacing units redeploying from “white” areas.

The size of the force at any given time may inform or be informed by the capabilities that are required at each successive stage, depending on whether a force cap or conditions are driving the withdrawal. As the size of the force declines, prioritization of capabilities becomes an acute concern in order to enable continued, if limited, operations, to protect the force, and to provide continued assistance to the target state. Approaches span the continuum of a small slice of many capabilities to a large slice of singular capabilities, with inherent risks along the spectrum; performing everything minimally or executing a few things well can both affect the stability of the state and security of the remaining forces. In Vietnam, CORDs and combat support capabilities remained the longest to reinforce the stability mechanisms under Vietnamization. The British employed a balance of capabilities in the areas in which they were operating, shifted them as they proceeded, and reduced them as conditions improved.

As the size of the force decreases, the tasks and expectations of the force must also be reduced to avoid over stressing the remaining forces. A smaller force is still capable of achieving progress toward national goals, but the objectives should be fewer, more narrowly focused and appropriate given the number of troops and capabilities on hand. For planners this means prioritization of tasks, transition of missions and activities to other host nation, government, or international organizations, or termination of projects that can no longer be resourced. This process should seek to reinforce the principal stability mechanisms in place. In Vietnam, as the force grew smaller they transitioned from conducting major offenses to providing combat support for the ARVN to providing only technical support. Because the British used an area approach in Malaya, force reductions occurred only in areas deemed “white” where success of the previous action reduced the tasks, expectations, and objectives to a level appropriate for the remaining forces and police.

Additionally, the decline in forces requires balancing ongoing operations, force protection, and disengagement. As withdrawal progresses, remaining forces can become more isolated and have fewer capabilities and support, becoming more vulnerable. Planners must acknowledge the security gap created by disengaging forces and the security risks to those withdrawing and the remaining forces. Host nation, international, or private security forces could potentially compensate for reduced organic capabilities. Emphasis should be placed on empowering the domestic security forces to the greatest extent possible and reasonable to avoid empowering groups (spoilers) that could challenge post-intervention government control. During the withdrawal from Vietnam, U.S. forces did not simply stop fighting and prepare for departure. Between and within units, some elements continued to fight, while others protected movement and points of debarkation. The ARVN augmented security in the final stages of the drawdown, reinforcing the government's monopoly on violence. In Malaya, the British reduced troop presence only in "white" areas. Ongoing operations and disengagement were not occurring in the same areas at the same time but were balanced over the theater, and the domestic civil authorities were sufficient to enable the disengagement.

In parallel with determining the priority of tasks, planners should assess the best geographic locations to sustain a presence to achieve the greatest long-term effect on stability. These locations must decrease in number commensurate or potentially exponentially with the declining force size. Identifying potential flashpoints, points or areas of influence/leverage, or multi-purpose locations (ie an airfield which is also a training base and a logistics hub on main avenues of approach) is useful to consolidating force presence and basing to maximize potential gains. The effort to prioritize and reduce the number of tasks and locations may be used to substantiate modifications to the force size and/or capability requirements to ensure continued security and stability. U.S. force withdrawals from Vietnam were based on an area's strategic importance to the survival of the state and debarkation, and the levels of ARVN capability and North Vietnamese threat within the area. The British expanded control over one geographic area

at a time in Malaya, prioritizing areas from least to most “black” to prevent further deterioration and accounting for greatest strategic importance to the survival of the federation.

These theoretical concepts and generalized considerations of withdrawal should augment, not supplant, doctrinal treatment of withdrawal and disengagement – to include the concepts of termination criteria and end state, the phasing of stability operations and enabling and transitioning to civil authority, and the science of redeployment as described in the literature review. To an experienced operational planner these ideas should be consistent with planning considerations for any operation, even though in this paper they are surmised strictly in terms of military withdrawal to illustrate their unique expression.

The theoretical concepts and considerations for withdrawal are intended to be useful to military planners in several ways. They educate planners on withdrawal so they can inform and make recommendations to military and political leadership on the appropriate exit strategy. They ensure military planners understand the positive and negative aspects of a given exit strategy so they can develop feasible plans that support the political decision while also potentially offsetting consequences. And they provide planners some useful facets to consider when orchestrating disengagement. For learning purposes, the concepts could also provide planners with a useful lens through which to view historical experience.

Conclusion

In the near future, the United States will continue to engage its military abroad. The U.S. national security interest in improving stability by encouraging governance and security will guide the conduct of those interventions, as demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. Dr. Toft’s theory of mutual benefit/mutual harm is useful in thinking about how to optimally balance benefit and harm mechanisms to generate stability with the goal of achieving an enduring peace. The limitation to her theory bears repeating. Regardless of how successfully an intervener employs

balanced and appropriate stability mechanisms during an operation and subsequent withdrawal, a determined external actor could thwart that stability, as seen in the Vietnam case study.¹⁸⁵

Beyond this limitation, within the operational context and flow of an intervention, the conduct of the military disengagement can support or undermine peacebuilding measures by alleviating, ignoring, or creating tensions, contributory factors to conflict, and causes of conflict renewal. As such, the character of the withdrawal matters not only to the initial accomplishment of goals but also to the potential for renewal of violence. The manner of a withdrawal serves as an opportunity to reinforce the stabilizing mechanisms developed during the intervention and perhaps continuing to be built simultaneous to and in conjunction with the disengagement. Also significant, even if the withdrawal is deliberate and coherent, the damage generated by an imbalanced benefit/harm operational construct and/or a flawed theory of conflict resolution is unchangeable by the manner of disengagement. The conditions we build and leave after an intervention and the manner in which we leave both matter to the endurance of the peace.

For military planners, this requires a holistic approach to planning a campaign from beginning to end. They must understand the desired political and military end states and formulate an informed appreciation of the balance and status of mutual benefit/mutual harm stability mechanisms necessary during all stages of the intervention to achieve the national aims. Finally, they must ensure that the exit strategy is deliberate and coherent within the strategic and operational context, and remains guided by an interest in stability.

This discussion is certainly not inclusive of all theory and discussion on withdrawal, but aims to contribute to the professional discourse, specifically for military operational planners. Additional quantitative study and qualitative analysis may clarify the relationship between the manner of withdrawal and the renewal of conflict. It could be that peace and stability are as over

¹⁸⁵ This has implications for the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan where Iran and Pakistan respectively, or actors within them, could challenge the stability mechanisms being developed as soon as U.S. and/or NATO troops are withdrawn and their ability to influence is diminished.

determined as conflict and that no single factor such as the manner of withdrawal can explain or predict the outcome.

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